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Introduction
While trade in commodities has for a long time been the traditional form of exchange between 
nations, at least since the 1980s an increasing number of firms have become multinational players 
by establishing subsidiaries abroad. As a result, world-wide foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
grown much faster than international trade and industrial production. According to the World 
Investment Report (2004) foreign direct investments measured as inward stocks have grown on 
average at a rate of about 13% per year between 1982 and 2003, this is almost twice as fast 
as world exports with an average annual growth rate of roughly 8% over the same period. For 
comparison, world GDP grew at an average annual rate of 5.5% in the period from 1982 to 2003 
(UNCTAD (2004, p. 9)).
It is, thus, not surprising that foreign direct investment and its carriers, the multinational en­
terprises (MNEs), have received a considerable amount of attention in the economic literature 
as well as in the policy debate. Since the 1980s, the economic literature has come a long way 
in examining these issues. Initially, the main challenge was to explain why some firms prefer 
to engage abroad directly instead of trading at arms-length. More recently the focus has shifted 
towards the characteristics of multinational enterprises and which firms are more likely to be­
come active abroad. A related, and still very much unresolved, question is why firms select 
different modes of entering a foreign market such as greenfield investments (i.e. setting up a new 
plant abroad) or cross-border mergers or acquisitions. In the light of many governments offering 
generous subsidies to attract investment from abroad, much of the literature has focused on the 
implications which the presence of foreign firm has on companies, employment, investment, and 
productivity growth in the host country.
In three essays, this thesis contributes to the literature by examining a multinational firm’s 
mode of serving a foreign market in different contexts. In doing so, it also looks at host country 
effects of foreign entry such as competition, changes in market structure and productivity. The 
first chapter examines to what extent policy measures aimed at reducing trade and investment 
barriers can induce firms to increase their trade and foreign direct investments inside an integrat­
Haller, Stefanie A. (2005), Multinational entry and host-country effects 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/94470
8 Introduction
ing region. In the second chapter, the question is how a multinational’s mode of entry affects 
the decisions of firms in the host country industry and what implications this interaction has for 
market structure, investments and welfare in the host-country. While the first two chapters at­
tempt to rationalise empirical observations in theoretical models, the third chapter is an empirical 
analysis. It examines whether foreign and domestic firms differ in their contributions to produc­
tivity growth. It also explores whether greenfield entry and entry via acquisition have a different 
impact on the productivity of host-country firms. The remainder of this introduction provides a 
non-technical summary of the three essays and their main contributions.
Chapter 1 is motivated by the observation that during the implementation of the Single Market 
Programme (SMP) in the European Union (EU) the share of foreign direct investments remaining 
within the EU has almost doubled. Similar developments have been observed in other regions 
that have taken measures towards economic integration, for example in NAFTA and ASEAN. 
The Single Market Programme was implemented in 1986 in order to eliminate remaining trade 
and investment barriers. At the time, the main impediments in the EU were customs and tax 
controls at borders, technical barriers, restrictive practices in government procurement, but also 
a variety of technical and product standards or complicated bureaucratic procedures for estab­
lishing new plants. On these grounds the question is, to what extent these policy measures can 
account for the substantial increase in intra-EU direct investments and the smaller increase in 
intra-EU trade.
In the integrating region there are groups of countries that are closer to each other than others. 
Even in a region where economic integration has been under way for some time, geographic 
distance may not be negligible. However, some countries may be closer to each other in terms of 
cultural distance such as a common language or traditionally strong business relationships. In the 
model there is a multinational enterprise located at a distance from one such group of countries 
contemplating how to serve these countries. It can do so by exporting from its home country 
in the ‘periphery’ or by setting up its own plant(s) in one or more of these ‘core’ countries and 
possibly export to the other countries from there. Investment is associated with a fixed cost of 
setting up a new plant; these fixed costs can be affected by policy measures. Exporting, in turn, 
involves a variable trade cost of which one part is due to any remaining trade barriers (‘tariff’); 
the other part is given by the distance of the exporter to its destination market, i.e. this distance 
cost is larger from the periphery to the core than within the core.
This setting is analysed under two scenarios that differ in the way firms compete. In the 
first scenario the MNE is the sole supplier of a certain good to the core. In the second scenario, 
the MNE faces competition from local incumbents - one in each core country - which can also
Haller, Stefanie A. (2005), Multinational entry and host-country effects 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/94470
9export to the other core countries. Regardless of the way firms compete, lowering barriers to 
investment which affect the fixed cost of setting up a new plant makes investment in one or 
more core countries more attractive. Under the first scenario, lowering barriers to trade makes 
exporting from the MNE’s home country in the periphery or consolidation of investment in fewer 
core countries more profitable as long as the periphery and the core are not too distant. The 
second possibility is suggestive for the large share of cross-border mergers and acquisition in 
FDI. However, this is only the case as long as the periphery and the core are not too distant. If 
the MNE is located at a greater distance to the core, a lower tariff will induce it to set up a plant 
in the largest core country and export to the other core countries from there (so-called ’export 
platform investment’). This is a likely outcome also for intermediate levels of periphery-core 
to within-core distance cost, the more and the larger the countries that can be served from the 
export platform in the core.
When the multinational firm faces competition the model gets a strategic dimension. As the 
local competitors also benefit from lower trade costs, competition reduces the multinational’s 
profits from investing in, as well as from exporting to, the core compared to the situation without 
competition. Hence, multinational activity in the core is less likely. Trade barriers have to be 
low for the MNE to export to the core, while core firms still find it profitable to trade within the 
core for intermediate levels of trade cost. If it is, however, profitable for the MNE to invest and 
trade costs are not too low, a duopoly between the MNE and the local incumbent arises in the 
core country where the MNE established its plant and exports from core country competitors are 
deterred.
Hence, the greenfield investment associated with the Single Market Programme can be at­
tributed to the decline in barriers to investment, but also to lower trade barriers where they made 
export-platform investment attractive, possibly by deterring competition. In turn, if the multi­
national had subsidiaries in several core countries before the SMP lower trade cost may have 
induced consolidation of these plants to one or two export platforms. This is indicative for the 
increase in cross-border mergers and acquisitions during the SMP but also for the increase in 
exports. Overall, the model is thus able to capture some of the main features of the Single Mar­
ket Programme. Its main contribution is to take the traditional trade-off between the fixed cost 
of establishing a new plant and the variable cost of exporting inside the realm of an integrating 
region.
While in the first chapter the distinction between different modes of foreign direct investment 
is only implicitly touched upon. Chapter 2 explicitly distinguishes between greenfield investment 
and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Varying slightly by source and the countries under
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10 Introduction
consideration, the evidence suggests that about one half to four-fifths of foreign direct investment 
takes the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) rather than greenfield FDI. The 
chapter looks in particular at the impact of these two different modes of multinational entry on 
the choices of the domestic firms in the industry and discusses the implications of this interaction 
for market structure, investments and host-country welfare.
The centre of attention in this chapter is a host-country industry which consists of two firms 
that differ in size and production technology. A foreign multinational is considering entering 
this industry; it can do so either by setting up a plant of its own (greenfield investment) or by 
acquiring one of the domestic firms. The domestic firms can react to this choice; this determines 
the market structure outcome. In the next step, then, all firms that are active in the market decide 
on how much to invest in a cost-reducing technology.
The multinational is assumed to be more efficient than either of the domestic firms. Moreover, 
it can also avail of its superior technology in the host country immediately and without additional 
cost. Thus, irrespective of its mode of entry, it will always capture the largest share of the market. 
As a result a domestic firm that is very inefficient compared to its competitors may stop serving 
the market. This can occur under either entry strategy of the MNE. In the case of greenfield 
investment, a merger among the domestic firms may also help them to improve their competitive 
stance against the strong position of the MNE. Looking at the incentives to invest in a cost- 
reducing technology in such a setting, it can be shown that the presence of a more efficient foreign 
firm in the domestic market will increase the overall level of investment in the industry. However, 
this comes at the cost of crowding out domestic investment when compared to a situation with 
domestic firms only. This result is very much in line with findings in the empirical literature. 
Regarding welfare, there are two opposing effects. The increase in efficiency reduces prices 
and increases consumer surplus. On the other hand, producer surplus decreases due to full profit 
repatriation on the part of the foreign firm. In most cases, the second effect outweighs the first, so 
that domestic welfare will typically be lower after foreign entry. As the focus of the model is on 
competition, this result should, however, be regarded as a lower bound to domestic welfare after 
foreign entry. It does not take into account possible benefits for the host countiy from foreign 
presence, such as re-invested earnings, local tax payments, training of workers or technology 
spillovers.
Two main conclusions arise that have not been recognised in the literature before: first the 
impact of foreign entry on the host country industry is not independent of possible reactions by 
the local incumbents. In turn, these can also affect the multinational’s choice of the mode of 
entry. Namely, the MNE’s technological advantage only favours greenfield investment over an
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acquisition when either the domestic firms are sufficiently competitive or when they are induced 
to eliminate competition among themselves by merging. Second, a concentrated market structure 
may result even if the multinational decides to set up its own plant when the domestic firms merge 
or exit the market as a consequence. This rationalises the observation that along with the surge 
in cross-border M&As as a share of FD1 concentration ratios have also risen in industries where 
horizontal FDI is prevalent.
Chapter 3 is a joint work with Ragnhild Balsvik from the Norwegian School of Economics 
and Business Administration in Bergen. Like Chapter 2 it looks at the different implications of 
greenfield and acquisition FDI for the host country. In contrast to Chapter 2, however, it uses 
empirical methods on a panel of Norwegian manufacturing plants from 1987-2001. The chap­
ter investigates whether domestic and foreign firms differ in their contributions to productivity 
growth which is the central force for economic welfare. It further asks whether foreign entry 
affects the productivity of domestic firms and whether the mode of foreign entry matters.
To answer the first question, productivity growth broken down into the contributions of en­
tering, surviving and exiting plants. The analysis further distinguishes between domestic and 
foreign-owned plants and considers plants that change ownership from domestic to foreign or 
vice versa as a separate group. As the results of this productivity decomposition are subject to 
cyclical fluctuations, two periods that are at similar points of the business cycles in the 1980s 
and in the 1990s are compared. Similar to studies for other countries the results indicate that 
the largest share of productivity growth is generated within surviving plants. The contribution to 
productivity growth from foreign plants has increased substantially from the period in the 80s to 
that in the 90s. To a certain extent, this reflects the fact that activity of foreign firms picked up 
noticeably after 1990. Foreign entrants are much more productive than their domestic counter­
parts. In the period in the 1990s, surviving foreign plants as well as plants acquired by foreign 
owners contribute a substantially larger share to productivity growth than their market shares 
would suggest.
To examine whether, in addition to its contribution to productivity growth, entry of foreign 
firms also affects the productivity of domestic firms, production functions are estimated. Using 
a traditional measure of overall foreign presence and entry suggests that the foreign plants in 
the Norwegian market exert a negative impact on the productivity of Norwegian-owned plants. 
Much of this negative effect seems to be accounted for by foreign entrants setting up new plants. 
Moreover, greenfield entry is associated with a competition effect. This finding is attributed 
to a market-stealing effect which forces the domestic plants up their average cost curves and 
consequently decreases their productivity. However, as the negative impact on domestic plant
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productivity is persistent when controlling for changes in market structure and competition, it 
might also be due to a different kind of stealing effect. It is conceivable that foreign firms attract 
highly qualified or highly motivated workers from domestic plants, leaving only the less produc­
tive resources behind. Foreign acquisitions, in turn, have a positive impact on the productivity 
of domestic plants and are not associated with competition effects. Existing local plants with 
foreign interests are likely to have established linkages with other plants in the host economy 
which may serve as a basis for possible knowledge or technology spillovers.
To summarise, this chapter demonstrates that there are a few highly productive greenfield 
entrants have a remarkable impact on the productivity of domestic plants. Part of this effect can 
be attributed to increased competition as a result of foreign entry and to foreign plants entering 
mainly in expanding sectors. In turn, plants that are acquired by foreign owners are not, on 
average, more productive than domestic plants. Nonetheless, they contribute substantially to 
overall productivity growth. In so doing, they generate positive externalities on the domestic 
plants. These plants may, in fact, serve as a channel for knowledge spillovers as they are well- 
integrated in the Norwegian market. The main contribution from this chapter is the distinction 
between greenfield and acquisition FDI as two different modes of foreign entry which allows us 
to draw the lines between spillover and competition effects more clearly.
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Chapter 1
Does Economic Integration Increase Intra-Region 
Direct Investment? 
Modelling the Experience of the EU’s 
Single Market
Abstract
We apply the fixed versus variable cost trade-off associated with a multinational 
firm’s choice between investing abroad and exporting to a setting where the multi­
national is located inside an economically integrating region. We find that reduc­
ing obstacles to investment unambiguously favours setting up plants. When trade 
barriers decrease typically there will be consolidation of investment or a switch to 
exports. If, however, distance to destination markets matters for the multinational, 
export platform investment in one country will be induced. This is indicative of some 
of the developments in trade and direct investment during the EU’s Single Market 
Programme.
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1.1 Introduction
Multilateral trade liberalisation after World War II had a remarkable impact on growth rates of 
exports and imports worldwide. The subsequent increases in industrial production and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) from the 1980s onwards were even greater. By taking additional mea­
sures towards trade and investment liberalisation, regional trading and integrating agreements 
have benefited from these developments more than proportionally. Taking Europe as an example, 
positive effects from integration on trade as well as on direct investment were already observable 
during the formative years of the European Community (see Balassa (1975) and Yannopoulos 
(1990)). More striking, however, is the doubling of the share of intra-region direct investment in 
total direct investment of the European Union (EU) along with the implementation of the Single 
Market Programme (see Figure 1.1 ).*
The Single Market Programme (SMP) was put in place in the mid-1980s in order to spur 
European integration beyond the early elimination of internal tariffs. Its aim was to achieve 
broad-scale harmonisation in a number of areas by 1992. Regarding trade and direct invest­
ment. the remaining impediments were customs and tax controls at borders, technical barriers, 
and restrictive practices in government procurement, but also a variety of technical and product 
standards or complicated bureaucratic procedures for establishing new plants (Monti (1996)). To 
what extent these policy measures can account for the strong reaction by firms regarding trade 
and investment decisions during the SMP is the question addressed in this chapter. We examine, 
in particular, the role of declining barriers to trade and to direct investment in a multinational 
firm’s decision whether to export to or to invest in its member countries in an integrating region.
Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of trade and direct investment in the EU at the time. Intra- 
EU12 trade as a share of total EU12 trade increased by 5 percentage points between 1986 and 
1992 to a level of roughly 55%, whereas intra-EU direct investment inflows and outflows doubled 
their share in total EU12 FDI flows from about 20% in the mid-1980s to more than 40% in 
1993. Similar developments are visible for EU15. Intra-EU trade accounts for approximately 
60% of total EU trade and intra-EU direct investment flows remained at a level of about 50% 
in total EU15 FDI after 1993. The increase in direct investment flows to the EU during the 
implementation of the SMP was accompanied by an increase in direct investment stocks, in 
particular those of EU and Japanese firms (Dunning (1997a), EC (1998a)). A large share of FDI 
results from mergers and acquisitions (M&A). According to Sleuwaegen (1998), they account
1 Similar increases o f intra-region FDI can be observed for NAFI'A (see e.g. various articles in Rugman (1994)) 
and ASEAN (Bende-Nabende (2000)).
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1.1 Introduction
Figure 1.1: Evolution of trade flows in EU12 (1980-1994) and EU15 (1980-2000)
EU15 - Imports and Exports In %of GDP
Exports
Evolution of direct investment flows in EU12 (1982-1994) and EU15 (1980-2000)
El/12 - Inflows and Outflows in % GDP lrrtr*-El/12 Inflows and Outflows m % of total
- - - -  Inflows
Source: Author’s compilation from OECD data.
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16 Does Economic Integration Increase Intra-Region Direct Investment?
for between 46% and 63% in the period from 1986 to 1994 in total EU12 inward FD1. Looking 
at M&As within the EU only, the number of mergers between firms located in the same member 
state doubled between 1987 and 1989 and diminished continuously thereafter. Cross-border 
mergers within the EU quadrupled after 1988 but fell back substantially after 1990, however the 
number of deals in 1994 (913) remains close to three times the level in 1987 (Sleuwaegen (1998) 
and European Economy (1999)).
Dunning (1997b) summarises the existing econometric work on direct investment associated 
with the Single Market in the EU. Among the few studies concerned with its impact on intra- 
EU direct investment, van Aarle (1996) finds that the EU12 countries trade and invest relatively 
more with and in each other, and. moreover, that the SMP has had a positive effect on inward 
and outward FDI and trade within the EU. Pain (1997) and Pain and Lansbury (1997) look at the 
stock of direct investment in the UK and Germany, respectively. They conclude that the SMP 
had a significant positive impact on the aggregate level of intra-EU direct investment by British 
as well as by German corporations in both industrial and services sectors.
In the theoretical literature, the decision between exporting and producing abroad is modelled 
as a trade-off between the fixed and the variable cost associated with these two possibilities.2 
Within this framework, models addressing the consequences of regional economic integration on 
multinational activity have been developed by Norman and Motta (1993) and Motta and Norman 
(1996). In their 1993 model they show that both market growth and improved accessibility due 
to economic integration will induce external firms to switch from exporting to FDI. In the second 
paper, they consider the impact of integration on the supply decision of an external firm and of 
two firms located inside an integrating region. For the external firm the above result continues 
to apply, while for the intra-region firms they obtain consolidation of intra-region investment to 
exporting. Taking the SMP as an example, Neary (2002) looks at the supply strategy of an MNE 
located outside an integrating region. He obtains tariff-jumping FDI to all union countries when 
the external tariff is high and the fixed cost of a new plant is relatively low. As internal tariff 
barriers go down, the MNE is likely to switch to export platform investment. When allowing 
for competition from domestic firms, one possible outcome is that the profits from investing or 
exporting are diluted to such an extent that the foreign firm decides not to supply the region at all 
( ‘fortress Europe outcome’). It may, however, also happen that the foreign firm is able to prevent 
intra-region firms from supplying a country by setting up a plant there.
2See Markusen (2002) for a textbook treatment.
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1.1 Introduction 17
While these papers direct attention mainly at the impact of integration on the changes in sup­
ply strategies of firms located outside the integrating region, no attempt has been made to model 
the trade and direct investment decisions of intra-region firms. Our task in this chapter is, there­
fore, to rationalise the near-doubling of intra-region direct investment and the increase in trade 
during the Single Market Programme by examining how decreasing internal barriers to trade and 
investment affect the supply decision of a multinational firm when both the multinational and its 
target markets are located inside the integrating region. The specification of the model is similar 
to the structure in Neary (2002), this is then re-interpreted and amended to capture the intra­
region focus. Geographically, the setting is such that the multinational is located in a country in 
an integrating region from where it has to overcome a greater distance to the markets it wants 
to serve than the firms based in these markets have to bridge to serve each other. The idea is 
that even in a region where economic integration has been underway for some time there will be 
groups of countries that are closer to each other than to the rest of the union countries. This may 
simply be in terms of geographic distance, but it can also be in terms of cultural proximity, like, 
for example, a common language or a similar way of doing business.3
We find that reducing obstacles to investment unambiguously favours setting up plants. When 
it comes to lowering trade barriers, the MNE’s supply decision depends on its location relative 
to the market(s) it wants to serve in the integrating region. If the MNE is in a rather remote 
location, lower trade barriers will induce it to set up a plant in the largest destination country and 
export to the adjacent markets from there. Both of these findings capture some of the greenfield 
investment associated with the Single Market Programme. In turn, if the MNE is located close 
to its destination market(s) in the integrating region, lowering trade barriers will induce consol­
idation of investment or exports. This is indicative of the increase in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions together with the SMP and the increase in exports. These predictions are derived in 
a setting where the MNE can act as a monopolist in its destination markets, which may serve as 
an approximation when the MNE has a strong technological or organisational advantage. When 
the MNE faces competition from a local incumbent and from exporters from the adjacent des­
tination market(s) instead, trade barriers need to be lower for the MNE to serve these markets 
at all. If it is profitable to do so, however, it will be mainly in the form of investment. In fact, 
for low but not too low trade barriers, investment by the MNE will deter the incumbents in the 
adjacent countries from exporting. Hence, this case is again indicative for greenfield investment
3The evidence on border effects and home bias suggests that regions that are close to each other do not extend 
beyond national borders. Nitsch (2002) finds that even after the Single Market Programme, EU countries trade 
on average ten times more within national borders than with other EU countries; Head and Mayer (2000) obtain a 
similar result at the industry level.
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or consolidation of investment for very low levels of trade cost. The model thus generates a set 
of predictions consistent with some of the observed developments in trade and investment during 
the Single Market Programme.
This chapter is structured as follows: In Section 1.2 the model setup is presented. The MNE’s 
supply decision is analysed when it is able to act as a monopolist in 1.3, and when it faces com­
petition from a local incumbent in its destination markets in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 summarises 
and concludes.
1.2 The Model
Following the tradition in the literature on foreign direct investment, we model the multina­
tional’s supply decision as a trade-ofF between the variable cost of exporting (such as trade and 
distance cost) and the fixed cost of setting up a new plant. Moreover, the analysis accounts for 
empirical results from gravity equations, where market size and distance capture much of the 
variation (see e.g. Clegg (1998) for the EU).
As outlined above, the object of analysis is a multinational firm located in a country which 
is a member of an economically integrating region (union). The countries in this region are 
supposed to have reduced internal trade barriers, but there are still obstacles to trade and also to 
investment.4 These obstacles translate into costs for firms when trading with or investing in the 
union member countries. In other words, in the region under consideration, economic integration 
is under way, but far from complete. Markets are therefore regarded as segmented.5
We look at firms in a single industry that are producing a homogeneous good. i.e. the model 
is one of partial equilibrium. In particular, consider a potential multinational enterprise located in 
a peripheral country when deciding to supply some or all of n (n > 2) core countries that differ 
in market size Si, but are symmetric with respect to the other parameters. The indirect demand
4For the EU, the extent o f such barriers before the SMP can be gauged from the Eurostat Business Survey (EC 
1998c), which questioned some 13,500 enterprises during the first half o f 1995. Regarding trade barriers, the ef­
fect o f the SMP on the elimination o f customs documentation, on the deregulation o f freight transport, and on the 
elimination of delays at frontiers was reported positive by, respectively, 60%, 43% and 56% of the enterprises. Con­
cerning potential barriers to investment, 31 % o f the firms questioned felt a positive impact from the harmonisation of 
technical regulations and/or standards, 32% from the mutual recognition o f technical regulations and/or standards, 
23% from the conformity of assessment procedures, and 13% from simplified patenting procedures.
See also Brenton and Vancauteren (2001) for more recent empirical evidence.
5 Venables (1990) compares the implications o f  a reduction in trade costs in a model of international trade under 
oligopoly when markets are segmented (i.e. when prices are set separately for each market) and when markets are 
integrated (i.e. when one price applies to all markets).
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function p{x, «¿) is such that J£- > 0 and < 0. Assume that countries are ordered according 
to market size: 1 > si > ... > sn > 0. The MNE produces at constant marginal cost c, that is, 
for simplicity, set equal to zero. If it decides to engage in foreign activity, this does not affect 
output and profits in its home country.
The main concern of the model is to see how changes in a multinational’s cost of trading 
and investing affect its mode of supply. Trade and investment are associated with different costs: 
Setting up a plant in another country entails a fixed setup cost / ,  which depends on barriers to 
investment. Exporting, in turn, is subject to a per-unit trade cost r  (0 < r  < 1). This trade cost 
is composed of two parts, a tariff t and a distance cost d: r d = t + d. The underlying notion is 
that trade cost can be split up in a part that is given by a country’s location (d) and a part that 
can be influenced by policy (t ). The tariff t (0 < t < 1) is given this name for expositional 
purposes; it is meant to be representative of any (non-)tariff trade barriers. It is assumed to be the 
same for all trade within the union. The distance cost d (0 < d < 1) depends on the location of 
the country from where the exports take place: d € {z , y} takes the value y  if the MNE exports 
from its home country in the periphery to the core, it takes the value z  if  exports take place within 
the core. The distance cost can be interpreted as transport cost: consider, for example, the way 
commodities have to travel from the Nordic countries to the central or Southern members of the 
EU. Another way to look at it is that some countries are more similar to each other than others; 
for example, in terms of culture or the way of doing business. In this case the costs of doing 
business differ between groups of countries.
Thus, when serving the core the MNE’s alternatives are associated with different costs. First, 
if it exports from its home country in the periphery it faces a per unit trade cost ry — t + y. 
Second, it can set up a plant in one of the core countries and serve the other core countries with 
exports from there. Establishing a plant in a core country, on the one hand, saves the MNE the 
tariff and the distance costs to this country, but, on the other hand, involves the fixed cost /  of 
setting up a plant. The core countries are closer to each other, therefore, exporting within the 
core is less costly than exporting from the periphery, per unit costs are t z =  t + z. Third, the 
MNE can decide to establish plants in more than one of the core countries, in which case FDI 
buys it preferential access to all of these markets at the cost of setting up. Not to engage in any 
core country at all remains, of course, also an option for the MNE. The figure below is a simple 
illustration of the trade cost between the MNE’s home country P and two core countries Ci and 
C2, where Ci is larger than C2.
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In the following section, we first analyse the MNE’s supply decision treating it as a monop­
olist. In the following section, we then analyse the situation where the MNE faces competition 
from one incumbent firm in each core country. In this setting, the MNE’s supply decision can 
have a strategic component. The analysis is set out in a general form. To illustrate ideas each 
section is accompanied by an example with linear demands of the form p (z , s*) =  ^1 — 
with 0 <  x  < Si < 1 for well-defined prices.6
1.3 The Supply Decision of the MNE as a Monopolist
First, the decision of a potential multinational located in a peripheral country is modelled under 
the assumption that it is the only supplier in this industry. The multinational can, thus, act as 
a monopolist under any supply regime. There are no other firms that might enter the market. 
This setting may well be a good approximation for a firm with a technological or organisational 
advantage, making it more likely to start production abroad. This applies in particular, whenever 
this firm manages to advance into a market where competitors have yet to establish themselves.
6Defining the indirect demand function in a more general way as p  (x) =  a — bx (a >  0, 6 >  0, |  <  x  <  a) 
and assuming that the marginal cost o f production c is non-zero, gives ^  as an alternative measure for market size 
(see Rowthom (1992 ) for a more detailed discussion).
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1.3 The Supply Decision of the MNE as a Monopolist 21
The MNE’s profits from exporting to a core country i are given by 71* r d) =  ^  (Si,t + d ) 1 
Quite naturally, they are increasing in the size of the market s* and decreasing in trade cost r d. 
If the tariff and the distance cost are at a sufficiently high level, it will not be profitable to export 
to any of the n core countries. In general, the prohibitive level of t given Si and d is defined 
implicitly by w(i, sif d) =  0. The prohibitive tariff t is smaller, the smaller the market size of 
country i and the larger the distance cost d  If the MNE decides to serve all n core countries via 
exports from its home country in the periphery (A »  at distance cost y, its profits are given by
n n
=  £ ^ 7 Ti{Si,Ty) = ',^ n i (si, t  + y) .  ( 1.1)
t=l i=l
Alternatively, the multinational can set up a plant in one of the core countries and supply the 
remaining core countries with exports. If it sets up a plant in a core country the MNE becomes 
a monopolist in that country, facing the fixed cost of setting up a plant / ,  but no other supply 
cost (7r<(si,0) =  7r,(si)). Exporting to the other core countries (A'c) entails the tariff and the 
within-core distance cost z . Other things being equal, as profits are increasing in market size, 
the MNE will invest first in the core country with the largest market (1,1), earning
n n
n /,l+*c _  T T j  _  j  + Y^TTiiSuT2) =  7Tj (si) “  /  + ^  (Si,i +  ^
¿=2 *=2
Comparing exports from the MNE’s home country to investing in one country and exporting 
from there, investing in core country 1 is profitable if
¿=2
ly (s l> t + / )
+  +  -
+ x { { n - l ) , S i , t  + z , t  + y) 
+ + -  +
(1.3)
7For the given specification of variable cost, profits can be shown to be convex in the trade barrier and 
distance cost, irrespective of the functional form of the demand function. The result of maximising oper­
ating profits (maxr 7r(-) =  max* [p(x, s») - c  —r]x ) by the choice of sales in country t can be written as 
7r* =  7T(p(x*Jsi ),x*^r).  By the envelope theorem — —x *, and, thus From the
first-order condition one can see that x* is decreasing in r, and hence n* is convex in r.
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is positive. The first term, yy ( s j ,£ -f y , f ) ,  measures the difference in profits between invest­
ing in country 1 (tti (si) — / ) ,  and exporting to this country from where the MNE is located 
(7Ti ( s \ J  + y)), i.e. it is the net gain from avoiding the tariff and the distance cost by investing. 
If this expression is positive, it is always profitable to establish a plant abroad. As can be seen 
from the profit function. % (si. t  + y, f )  is increasing in the trade cost from the periphery t + y, 
and decreasing in fixed cost / .  By the definition of the indirect demand function, it is increasing 
in market size
The second term \  ((n — 1), s*, t + z , t  + y) sums the differences in profits between export­
ing within the core and exporting from the periphery over all countries that the MNE can access 
at the lower distance cost by investing in country 1. In other words, country 1 can be viewed as an 
“export platform” to the other core countries. This export platform gain is always positive, since 
y > z and profits t +  and 7^ (5*, t + y) are decreasing in trade cost. That is, this term can 
render investing in one core country profitable even if the trade cost avoiding gain (the first term 
in equation (1.3)) is negative. \  ((n ~  1)' s*> * +  -M +  i/) is decreasing in the within-core trade 
cost t -I- 2 but increasing in the core-periphery trade cost t +  y. By the convexity of profits in r d, 
the export platform gain is decreasing in t, i.e. 7u(8i, t + z) decreases by more than 7r*(sj, t +  y) 
when t increases. Moreover, \  ((n — 1), s*, t +  z, t + y) is increasing in the number of countries 
(n — 1) close to country 1 and in their market size st. This means that investing in country 1 is 
more attractive the more countries can be served at a low distance and the larger their size.
Setting up plants in m (m < n ) core countries instead earns the MNE profits of
n /,m+*c =  £ £  t fa )  _  f} + £ " =m+, 7Tj (Si, t + Z)
=  n '" 1- 1'+YC +  lz  t + Z. f ) (1.4)
+  + -  
where 7* (sm, t + z, f )  =  7rm (sm) -  /  -  7rm (sm, t + z ) .
The profits from investing in m  countries can be expressed as a function of the profits from 
investing in m — 1 countries plus the term (sm, t + z, / ) .  It is profitable to invest in an addi­
tional core country as long as this trade cost avoiding gain is positive. j z (sm, t. + z , f )  depends 
on trade and fixed cost as well as on market size in the same way as % (sm, t + y, / ) .  However, 
here instead of y the lower within-core distance cost z  enters, implying that the additional gain 
from investing in a further core country will always be lower than the profit from the investment 
in country 1. In addition, 7* (sm, t + z, f )  depends on the market size of country m  and not on 
that of the larger country 1. Thus, the lower within-core distance cost and the smaller market size
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can make it less profitable to invest in many or all core countries. If setting up in all countries is
profitable (7* (sm,t + z, / )  > 0 for m  =  1, n), total profits amount to
n
n "  =  E  I* <**> -  /I ■ 
i= 1
implying that fixed cost cannot exceed /  =  7r* (<%) in each country i, respectively; i.e. the upper 
bound for investment f St increases with the size of the market.
To summarise the impact of the different parameters, the incentive to invest in core country 1
stems from the difference in distance cost. In the absence of distance costs the MNE’s decision 
would be driven only by the tariff and by market size.8 The decision between exporting and 
investing in the core in this case would simply be a trade-off between the tariff and the fixed cost. 
Without distance costs, equation (1.3) does not produce the export platform term, but only the 
term that arises from trade cost jumping
7 («1, t, f )  =  r i ( s i ) - / - 7 T i ( 8 i , i ) .  (15)
+ + -
This extends to investing in m < n  countries in the same way as in equation (1.4), and therefore, 
as long as j ( s m, t, / )  is positive it pays to invest in more than one core country in order to avoid 
the tariff. If, in addition, all core countries had the same market size, without distance cost the 
MNE would either invest in all core countries or export to all of them or not serve them at all 
depending on the levels of the tariff and the fixed cost.
In the presence of different within-core and periphery-core distance costs, however, a high 
trade cost from the periphery favours investment in more than one country via its positive impact 
on the trade cost avoiding gain. The first plant in the largest core country in any case gives the 
highest trade cost avoiding gain, because this saves the tariff and the periphery-core distance 
cost. Investing in any further core country will still save the MNE the tariff; it will, however, 
no longer save it the periphery-core distance cost but only the lower within-core distance cost.
In addition the smaller market size of these core countries makes investment there relatively less
attractive.
8Note that such a situation can be interpreted in two ways here: either all countries inside the union can be served 
at the same cost, or alternatively that the MNE is located amidst its destination markets in the core.
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Thus, regarding the SMP’s attack on border formalities as a reduction in variable trade cost, 
a lower trade barrier t implies that the gain from avoiding the trade cost will be smaller, but the 
export platform gain will be larger. The relative levels of t + z and t + y  determine which of the 
two effects dominates. That is. if the trade cost from the periphery is high relative to the trade cost 
within the core, lowering the tariff will increase the profitability of export platform investment 
relative to exporting. This is also a possible outcome if periphery-core and within-core distance 
cost differ less, but there are many core countries that can be served from the export platform. 
Finally, if the trade cost from the periphery is close to the trade cost within the core, lowering 
t will render trade cost jumping less attractive and, thus, exporting from the periphery will be 
preferred to export platform investment.
Going back to the empirical evidence, SMP measures aimed at barriers to trade have certainly 
eroded the trade cost avoiding motive further and, hence, facilitated exports. In turn, the outcome 
of the model where a lower tariff makes export platform investment more attractive reflects the 
surge in mergers and acquisitions across community borders. Empirically, very few studies find 
trade and direct investment to be substitutes for each other. Specifically for the case of the EU, 
Fontagne (1999) provides evidence more in favour of a complementary relationship. However, 
noting that intra-EU one-way trade decreased considerably during the implementation of the 
SMP, while at the same time intra-industry trade in differentiated products (trade in intermediate 
goods), which is generally associated with multinational activity, increased9, suggests that there 
has nonetheless been trade-replacing FDI. The lowering of non-tariff trade barriers is likely to be 
among the drivers of this development.
Concerning the cost of setting up, a high fixed cost makes exporting - even from the periphery 
- more attractive. However, even for intermediate values of fixed cost, setting up a plant in one 
core country from which the core is served with exports can be profitable. Due to SMP mea­
sures such as harmonisation of technical and product standards or improved business relations 
across countries one can aigue that the fixed cost o f  setting up a plant has decreased. Therefore, 
investment in general has become more attractive. In particular, investing in a core country will 
be more attractive the more countries are accessible from this export platform. This captures 
mainly so-called ‘greenfield investment’. Moreover, it is representative of the fact that between 
1986 and 1994 in mergers and acquisitions the most actively targeted sectors were distribution 
and wholesale (Sleuwaegen (1998)). The example below will illustrate both channels further.
9Two-way trade in vertically differentiated products went up from roughly 35% to 42% form 1986 to 1994, 
whereas the share o f one-way trade in intra-EU12 trade decreased from about 47% to 38% over the same period 
(EC (1998b), ch. 4).
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Example with linear demands and quantities as the strategic variable
Taking the indirect demand function to be p(si, x) =  ^1 — output is given in the upper half 
of Table 1.1. Plugging these values into equation (1.3) the threshold between exporting from the 
periphery with investing in country 1 and exporting from there can be obtained as
(1.6)
Comparing investment in m  with investment in m  — 1 core countries, the equivalent to equation
/ ' — =  (,.7)
The graphs in Figure 1.2 plot equations (1.6) and (1.7) for two core countries with market size 
Sj =  1 and «2 =  0.8 in the / ,  t — space for given values of ;  and y {z — 0.1, y = 0.2 (top) and 
y =  0.7 (bottom)).
Looking at the impact of fixed cost, first fix t at a low level (below the prohibitive tariff for 
exports from the periphery Im n e p )- For high fixed cost, the MNE will be exporting from the 
periphery (Xp).  When fixed costs decrease, at some point export platform investment in one 
core country ( /, 1 +  Ac)  becomes profitable and for low levels of fixed cost establishing a plant 
in both core countries ( /, 2) will be worthwhile. Next fix t at a level above Imnep- In this case 
the MNE will not find it profitable to supply the core (0) for high values of fixed cost. As fixed 
costs decrease, again, export platform investment in the largest core country becomes profitable 
(/, 1 +  Xc).  (Even if t is above the prohibitive level for exports within the core Imnec> there 
will still be investment in core country 1 ( /,  1).) Finally, for low levels of fixed cost the MNE 
will invest in both core countries ( / ,  2).
As for the tariff, given a high level of fixed cost, the MNE will not supply the core (0) if the 
tariff is prohibitive, otherwise it will export from the periphery {Xp). For intermediate values of 
fixed cost the effect of lowering t depends on the level of periphery-core to within-core distance 
cost. If periphery-core distance cost is not much higher than within-core distance cost, a lower 
tariffbarrier will induce a shift from export platform investment in one core country (1 ,1+A'c) to 
exports from the periphery (A'p), as in the upper panel of Figure 1.2. If. instead, periphery-core 
distance cost are high relative to within-core distance cost the opposite will be the case: a lower 
tariff can induce a shift from exporting from the peripheiy (Xp)  to export platform investment in 
core country 1 (1 ,1 + Xc)  as in the lower panel of Figure 1.2. Given the remaining parameters
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Table 1.1: Sales of different firms under alternative supply strategies
The MNE as a monopolist
supply sales in country i by the
strategy MNE 0: ¿Co « Home Firm i: Xi * Core Firm j: Xji
X p
L i  + X c , j  
I , n
s,, * * *
« i
s .i ot 2
sales in country j  (J ^  i) by the
MNE 0: x0j  Home Firm i: x itj Core Firm j : Xjj
X p S.3 2
I , i  + X c , j »j j
I ,  n s i*32
The MNE facing competition from n core firms
supply sales in country i by the
strategy MNE 0: Xo.t Home Firm i : Xi,i Core Firm j :
X p
I  , i  + X c , j  
I , n
„ 1+ ui+y n 1-2 t+y-äz
S‘ n+2„ l-(n-l)t+(n-l)z n+2„ 1—(n—l)t+(n—l)z ** n+2 1—3<—3z
n+2l-(n-l)i+(n-l)2 n+2l-(n-l)t+(n-l)* ** n+2 l-3t-3z
S* n+2 n+2 8t n+2
sales in country j  ( j ^  i ) by the
MNE 0: x0j Home Firm i : x ltJ Core Firm j : Xjj
X p
I , i  + X c i j  
I , n
„ l - 2i-(n+l)y+(n-l)z „ l-2t+v-3z 1 +ni+y+ (n— 1 )z
Si  n+2
1—2t—2z 
n+21—(n—l)t+(n— l)z
Si n+2 . l - 2i - 2z 
b3 n+2  ^ l-3t-3z
bi n+2l+nf+n*
n+2_ 1—(n—l)t+(n—l)z
, sl .........Vk±2 ........ ........Sl  .n±2 ............ ri±2 ....
where 1 < i < m  and m < j  < n 
X p : Exports from the periphery P
I, t + Xc,  j : Investment in country t and exports within the core C to country j
/ ,  n: Investment in n (all) core countries
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Figure 1.2: The monopoly case for two core countries 
Peripheiy-core distance cost small relative to within-core distance cost (y =  0.2)
Xp/c
l,n;
0:
h i N E  
/* :
p / c •
Exports from the periphery (P) or the core (C)
Investment in n countries 
no supply
prohibitive tariff for the MNE for exports from the periphery (P)/ 
within the core (C)
maximum level of fixed cost covered by market size s of country i
parameters: Si = 1, s-2 = 0.8, z = 0.1
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in this example, equation 1.6 will be concave as in the lower panel of Figure 1.2 for values of 
y > 0.6 — 0.5t. Finally, for low levels of fixed cost, a lowering of tariff barriers unambiguously 
induces consolidation of investment ( /, 2 to / ,  1 +  A'c).
Figure 1.3 repeats the analysis for three core countries where the third core country is as­
sumed to have market size s$ =  0.5. As there are now more markets that can be served from 
country 1. the region where we observe export platform investment in the largest core country 
(1, 1 + A c) is larger than before. This can be seen by noticing that the periphery-core distance 
cost here only need to be larger than y > 0.4913 — 0.43478? for equation 1.6 to be concave. 
The region where there was investment in two core countries in Figure 1.2, in turn, is split into a 
region with export platform investment in the two larger core countries plus exports to the small­
est core country from there (7,2 +  A'c) and a region with investment in all three core countries 
( /, 3). The reasoning for lower fixed cost or a lower tariff barrier is qualitatively the same as in 
the two core country case above.
1.4 The Supply Decision when the Multinational Faces Com­
petition
The analysis conducted for the multinational as a monopolist can be regarded as a good approx­
imation in the most innovative industries; however, it is likely that the MNE will face some sort 
of competition. The amount of competition introduced here is restricted to local incumbent firms 
in the core countries. These firms always supply their home market, and if profitable they export 
to the other core countries. To keep things tractable they do not have the possibility to invest 
abroad. All firms still treat markets as segmented. There is no entry of firms other than those 
mentioned so far. That is, in each market there are between two (if the tariff is such that it is 
profitable for the MNE to invest, but too high for the other core firms to export), and n + 1 firms 
operating.10 Demands are linear with intercept and slope normalised to 1, and firms compete in 
quantities. This results in a Coumot-Nash equilibrium.
l0Considering only cases where it is profitable for the MNE to serve the core at all.
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Figure 1.3: The monopoly case for three core countries 
Periphery-core distance cost small relative to within-core distance cost (y =  0.2)
Periphery-core distance cost large relative to within-core distance cost (y = 0.7)
X p /c • Exports from the periphery (P) or the core (C)
I,n: Investment in 7? countries
0: no supply
hfNEP/c: prohibitive tariff for the MNE for exports from the periphery (P)/
within the core (C)
f Si: maximum level of fixed cost covered by market size s of country i
parameters: s\ =  1, «•> =  0.8, «3 =  0.5, 2 = 0.1
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Denote by x* =  the total amount of sales of all k  firms in market i. With total sales
divided by market size the profits of firm k in any market i are
7Tfc,i =  (1 -  Tfc -  — )xk,i =  (1 -  ifc -  dk -  —)Zk.i, (1.8)
Si Si
where trade cost r* are again composed of the tariff and the distance cost of*. The tariff is 
tk = t for all firms that export to this market, and tk — 0 for the domestic firm and for the MNE 
if it decides to invest in country i. The distance cost dk is equal to y for the multinational if it 
decides to export to a core country from its home country, it is equal to z for the exports of any 
firm located in the core and equal to zero for any firm with a plant in this market. The MNE is
labelled k =  0 , the local firm in market i is k — i, and 0 < k ^  i is left for the incumbents in
the other core countries. When profits of the multinational are referred to, the firm subscript k 
will be suppressed in the following. From (1.8) the first order condition for output of firm k in 
market i is given by
x k,i =  *  ( l  “
i.e. equilibrium profits are given by Xk.i  =  s, ^1 — ^  j  . When it is profitable for all firms
to be active in market i, total sales in this market can be obtained as
1 +  n -  f d
Xi = Si-------— — , ( 1.10)
n + 2
where f d — Plugging this back into (1.9) output of each firm is
_  1 -  (n. + 1)t£ + f t k
£k,i — . rt * (*•**) n + 2
where f£fc denotes the trade cost (i.e. the sum of the tariff and the distance cost) of all firms 
other than firm k  operating in this market. The output of the MNE, the domestic firm and a core 
country firm are calculated explicitly in Table 1.1 for the case of n + 1 firms (lower half).
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From equation (1.11) one can see that a firm’s sales and hence its profits in a market are 
decreasing in its own access cost (trade cost) and increasing in its competitors’ access costs to 
this market11:
7T*,i =  7T (* , 7*, f t k)
+ -  +
By assumption, profits are increasing in market size. If trade costs change simultaneously for 
firm k  and its n — 1 competitors, one obtains
+ ( n - l ) g < 0. (M3,
From equation (1.11) one can see that the direct effect dominates. Thus, as either component of 
the trade cost increases, output, and therefore profits, fall.
The analysis of the different supply strategies proceeds much the same way as above. Con­
sider first the multinational’s profits from exporting to all core countries
n n
n Xp =  ^  7Ti [Si, Ty\ (n -  l ) r z] =  t +  y; (« -  1) (i +  -)] - (1-14)
¿=1 t=l
The properties of the profit function in one market (equation (1.12)) continue to hold; total profits 
are also increasing in market size Si, decreasing in own trade cost t +  y and increasing in the
competitors’ trade cost t + z. The negative effect of own trade cost dominates (see (1.13)),
implying that total exports are decreasing in t. From the expressions in Table 1.1, note that the 
prohibitive tariffs differ according to the location of firms. For the multinational the prohibitive 
tariff for exports from its home country to market i given distance cost is
1 -  (n + 1)jH- (» -  l)z 
2t'MNEp ~  ---------------o-------------- • (1-15)
If the MNE exports from the periphery the prohibitive tariff for exports of a core country firm to 
market i given distance cost is
1 — 35 + v
t c r x =  -------2 ^ -  ( 1 1 6 )
11 Neaiy (2002) proves that this result also applies to different specifications of demand functions. In his Appendix 
he shows that the properties in (1.12) hold for Bertrand as well as for Cournot competition with linear demands and 
differentiated products. They also hold under Coumot competition with general demands except when demands are 
highly convex and the firm in question has a relatively small market share.
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As c approaches y the prohibitive tariff for the MNE approaches that of a core firm (for c =  y 
we get i  = =  ^ £). Otherwise, the prohibitive tariff for the core firms is always higher
than that of the multinational.12 This implies that the presence of competitors with lower access 
cost to market i limits the range of parameter values where the MNE finds it profitable to export 
to any core country. There are parameter values such that the MNE will never export to the core 
market, but where the firms in the core countries will still trade among each other. Nonnegativity 
constraints on (1.15) and (1.16) as well as the condition 0 < z < y reduce MNE activity and 
interaction with local incumbents to a smaller parameter space than in the monopoly case. If 
both the tariff and the within-core distance cost were zero, the MNE would find it profitable to 
export to the core up to a maximum value of the periphery-core distance cost of y < .
If the MNE decides to invest in one core country instead, the prohibitive tariff given within- 
core distance cost 2 for the core firms lowers to tcFj =  Thus, for values of trade cost
larger than this, investment by the multinational generates duopoly profits for the MNE and the 
local firm in this country, with the other core firms abandoning this market.13 For values of 
(t + z)CFj < |  the multinational still faces competition from core exporters wherever it decides 
to establish a plant. By investing in the core the MNE benefits from lower distance costs for 
exports to the other core markets. Its total profits from investing in, as before, the core country 
with the largest market size (country 1) are
n
n /1+ Yc =  7T1 [si; (n -  1) (t + z)] -  f  + ^ 2  Is*’ 1 + (n - ! ) ( <  + ~)1 • (1-17)
t=2
While in the monopoly case lower trade cost unambiguously increase the profits from investing, 
this need not always be the case under competition. Deriving (1.17) with respect to within-core 
trade cost r2 gives
¿n/.i+*c _  y ''" (r> _  n  t e  -l 1
d r 1 ~  2 dr* ^ v "  ^ [ S t *  ‘r  ¿ -yt= 2 0 T * J ’ j g^
+ +
where the superscripts o and c denote the own and the competition effect, respectively. With 
lower tariffs the own effect from investing in one country still increases profits. However, this 
means that the MNE’s competitors also have easier access to market 1, and therefore the negative
l2tc F — tMNE — > 0 for 0 <  z <  y.
13Counting the number of firms that produce in a core country suggests a duopoly whenever the MNE decides 
to invest. However, only if  trade cost are such that investment by the MNE drives the exporters from other core 
countries out o f the market, the MNE and the local incumbent also earn duopoly profits.
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impact on profits due to increased competition may easily outweigh the positive own effect. In 
the case of the demand function employed in ( 1.8), equation (1.18) becomes
rfn;,i+xc
dt (n + 2Y 2 ¿ « t  -  si (n -  1) -  (t + z)i=2
si (n -  l)2 +  4
i=2
(1.19)
Normalising S\ to 1, this says that for values of t + 2 >  the impact from competi­
tion dominates. If all core country markets were of equal size (sj =  st =  1), this would be equal 
to t + z > ^ 3.14 This threshold is decreasing in the number of countries that are to be served 
from country 1. If, in addition, these countries have small market sizes, the threshold for the 
own effect to dominate is further reduced. Taken together this implies that under competition, a 
lowering of trade cost is unlikely to induce a switch to export platform investment.
Comparing profits from investing in one core country with the profits from exporting to all 
core countries from the periphery, yields a decomposition similar to the monopoly case:
j-j/.l+A c _ II 'to
' t + z, t +  y-> / )
+ + + —
+ Xc  (Si, t +  z, t + y , ( « - ! ) ) »
+ — + +
( 1-20)
where 7^  (sI t f +  z , t  +  y, f )
= TTi [«i; (n -  1) (t +  z)] -  f  -  7T! [sj ,t  +  y ; (n -  1) (t + z)] 
and \ c ( ( n - l  ),Si,t + z , t  + y)
= E "=2 {** (*># +  z; («■ -  1) (t + -)] -  TTi h ,  t +  y; (» -  1) (t + ^)]}.
The trade and distance cost avoiding gain 7^ ( s i ,t. + z,t. + y , f )  is increasing in the market 
size of country 1 and decreasing in the fixed setup cost / .  It is increasing in the core-periphery 
trade cost t +  y as well as in the within-core trade cost t + z. The export platform gain x c (si, t + 
z , t  + y. (n — 1)) is increasing in the number of countries close to country 1, in the market size 
of these countries, and in the periphery-core trade cost t. +  y. It is decreasing in within-core trade 
cost t + z. Thus, while it becomes unlikely that a lower tariff induces export platform investment, 
the remaining parameters work in the same direction as in the monopoly case. This also holds for 
setting up plants in more than one core country. The profits from investing in m  core countries
l4A similar resuli is obtained by Neary (2002), p. 305.
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in the order of their market size can be written as
m n
n i,m  =  {7Ti [s.; (77 -  1)(* + z)} -  / }  +  +  z ;(r?  -  !)(£  +  z)] (1 .2 1 )
i= m + l
n / , — 1  +  7 c  { S m y  t  +  Z y  f ) m
+  +
In this case, too, as long as 7f  (sm, t + z , f )  is positive, it is profitable to establish plants in further 
core countries.
In the range of parameters where investment by the MNE gives rise to a duopoly by deter­
ring exports from the core country incumbents, the trade cost avoiding gain in equation (1.20) 
becomes j y ( s i , t  +  y , t  +  z , f )  =  7rf(si) -  /  — ?ri [sj, t + y; (11 -  1) (t, + ¿)]. This expression 
now depends negatively on the within-core trade cost t + z. However, from (1.13) note that the 
direct effect of the periphery-core distance cost y  in 7ri [sj , t + y; (n — 1 )(t, + ;)] dominates.
In the presence of competition the overall picture remains similar to that of the monopoly 
case. On the one hand, lower trade and investment barriers favour competition between the 
MNE and core firms. This makes it less attractive for the MNE to engage in the core at all. On 
the other hand, if fixed costs are such that investing in at least one core country is profitable and 
within-core distance cost are not too low, investment by the MNE can even deter competition 
from the other core country firms. Thus, this case can be held representative for some of the 
greenfield investment. It is also representative for the increase in exports at the time of the SMP, 
in particular the increase in intra-industry trade in industries with high non-tariff barriers (EC 
(1998b), p. 115).
Example with linear demands and Cournot competition
Output for the different firms under alternative supply strategies of the MNE (in the parameter 
range where all firms are active) are calculated in the lower part of Table 1.1. The threshold 
between investing in core country 1 and exporting from the periphery (equation ( 1.20)) is, thus, 
given by
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This holds for tariffs up to the prohibitive level for the MNE t.MNEp =  1~-— Above 
that export platform investment in core country 1 by the MNE has to be compared to not supply­
ing the core. Note that here, the higher the periphery-core distance cost y , the less likely it is that 
the MNE exports to the core at all from the periphery. Core country firms, on the other hand, 
will only stop exporting within the core for Icfx > • If, however, fixed costs are such
that the MNE invests, then core firms will already stop exporting above Icf, = For trade 
barriers higher than this, the MNE shares the market in country 1 only with the local incumbent. 
In this case, the first-term in equation (1.22) has to be replaced by the Cournot duopoly profits of 
» . ( i ) 2 ; the other terms remain unchanged.
For investment in additional countries the threshold between investing in m  and m — 1 core 
countries (equation ( 1.21)) is given by
r/,m <=> 7,m—
In this equation too, for tariffs above £cf, > the first term has to be replaced by the Cournot 
duopoly profits of sm ( | ) 2 .
Thus, as can be seen from Figure 1.4, strategic interaction increases the number of possible 
outcomes of the MNE’s supply decision. The two graphs depict the same situation as in the 
upper panels of Figures 1.2 and 1.3 for the case with competition (2 and 3 countries, si — 
1, s2 =  0.8, S3 =  0.5, 0 =  0.1, y =  0.2).15 In square brackets are the supply strategies for the 
core country firms (exports [Ar] or no supply [0]).
Looking at fixed cost first, if  the tariff is held fixed at a level below the prohibitive level for 
exports (tMNEp), the MNE will export from the periphery (Xp). For lower values of fixed cost 
there will be export platform investment ( / ,  i + Xc)  or investment in all core countries ( /,  2 or 
1,3) as before. When the trade barrier is above the prohibitive level for exports by the MNE 
and fixed costs are high, the MNE will not supply the core at all, while core country firms may 
still find it profitable to export within the core (0 [A']). For lower values of fixed cost, investment 
in one core country by the MNE may make it unprofitable for the core firms to export to this 
market. In this case, the MNE and the local incumbent earn duopoly profits in this country. Such 
investment serves as an export platform (D, i +  A c) up to the prohibitive tariff for exports by the 
MNE within the core t-MNEc * above which the MNE keeps its plant, but stops exporting (D, i).
l5If y  =  0.7 as in the lower panels o f Figures 1.2 and 1.3, the region where the MNE exports from the periphery' 
disappears from the picture. In turn, export platform investment in country 1 will be profitable up to slightly higher 
values o f / ,  the slope o f this threshold will remain smaller than 1 though.
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Figure 1.4: The competition case 
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X p/c- exports by the MNE from the periphery (P) or the core (C)
I,n/D,n:  investment/duopoly outcome in n countries
0: no supply
hfNEP/c : prohibitive tariff for the MNE for exports from the periphery (P)/
within the core (C)
icFX/ r  prohibitive tariff for the core firms if the MNE exports from the
periphery (X) or invests (I) 
f Si: maximum level of fixed cost covered by market size s of country i
[supply mode of core country firms]: [X] - exports, [0] - no supply 
parameters: s\ = 1, s2 = 0.8, s3 = 0.5, z — 0.1, y — 0.2
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Taking forgiven a high level of fixed cost, lower tariff barriers will induce the MNE to export 
from the periphery (0 to Xp). At low levels of fixed cost a decrease in tariff barriers first allows 
the MNE to export from the country where it has established a plant to the other core countries 
(D,i  to D ,i  + X c )  without having to fear competition from other core country firms. When 
tariff barriers decrease below tcFn the MNE’s profits from investing will be diluted as core firms 
find it profitable to export as well.
Summarising, due to the competition, trade and investment barriers need to fall by more than 
in the monopoly case for the MNE to engage in the core. If it is profitable for the MNE to invest, 
however, it may be able to deter competition from exporters with its investment.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter analyses the decision of a multinational enterprise located inside an integrating re­
gion whether to supply a group of other countries in this region by investing there or via exports. 
Investing involves a fixed cost to establish production facilities. Exports, in turn, are subject to a 
trade cost of which one part is due to remaining trade barriers (‘tarifF) and the other part depends 
on the distance of the multinational’s production facilities to its destination markets. The desti­
nation countries (‘core’) are assumed to be close to each other, either in terms of geographical 
distance or in terms of cultural linkages.
Within this setting the impact of a lowering of (non-)tariff barriers to trade and barriers to 
investment as suggested by measures associated with the Single Market Programme in the EU 
is examined. If the MNE is able to act as a monopolist, lowering barriers to trade, such as 
abolishing border formalities, makes exporting from the MNE’s home country in the ‘periphery’ 
or consolidation of investment in fewer core countries more profitable. This accounts for the 
surge in cross-border mergers and acquisitions within the EU from 1988 to 1990.16 If, however, 
trade costs (tariff plus distance costs) from the periphery to the core are much higher than within 
the core a lower tariff will make export platform investment more attractive than exports. This 
will also be the more likely outcome for intermediate levels of periphery-core to within-core 
distance cost, the more and the larger the countries that can be served from the export platform 
in the core. This situation accounts for some of the greenfield investment associated with the 
Single Market.
,6Falvey (1998) and Horn and Persson (2001) examine incentives for mergers brought about by trade policy in 
two-country models.
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Arguing that the SMP has affected the fixed cost of setting up a plant, the model predicts 
that rather than exporting or not supplying the core at all the multinational will invest first in 
the largest of the core countries. For low values of fixed cost, investment in more than one 
core country is also a possible outcome. This is another explanation for some of the greenfield 
investment the SMP has brought about.
If the multinational faces competition from core country incumbents that are able to export 
to the other core countries, the model gets a strategic dimension. As the local competitors also 
benefit from lower trade costs, competition reduces the multinational’s profits from investing in 
as well as from exporting to the core compared to the monopoly case. Hence, MNE activity 
in the core is less likely. Trade barriers have to be low for the MNE to export to the core, 
while core firms still find it profitable to trade within the core for intermediate levels of trade 
cost. If parameters are such that investment is profitable and trade costs (or within-core distance 
costs) are not too low, a duopoly between the MNE and the local incumbent will arise in the 
core country where the MNE established its plant and exports from core country competitors are 
deterred.
MNE activity in the model is motivated by market-seeking motives throughout. It does not 
account for factor cost considerations, for example, which may well have been at the root of the 
increase in FDI flows going from the core (the founding members of the EU plus the UK) to 
the periphery between 1980 and 1992 (see Morsink (1998), p. 69). The model also neglects the 
impressive amounts of intra-EU FDI small countries such as Belgium and, in particular, Ireland 
have been able to attract. Next to the these considerations, future research should develop the 
analysis further by allowing for competition from other potential multinationals and possibly for 
reciprocal investment.
Haller, Stefanie A. (2005), Multinational entry and host-country effects 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/94470
Chapter 2
The Impact of Multinational Entry on Domestic 
Market Structure and R&D
Abstract
We model the impact of different modes of multinational entry on the choices of 
domestic firms. Focusing on the competitive effects of foreign presence in the host 
country, we demonstrate that greenfield investment will increase competition only if 
it is not countered by anti-competitive reactions on the part of the domestic firms. 
Considering also cross-border mergers and acquisitions the model, thus, provides 
two alternative explanations for the increase in concentration ratios in industries with 
mostly horizontal foreign direct investment. Moreover, foreign presence is shown to 
raise total investment in the local industry at the cost of crowding out domestic R&D.
Haller, Stefanie A. (2005), Multinational entry and host-country effects 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/94470
40 The Impact of Multinational Entry on Domestic Market Structure and R&D
2.1 Introduction
Worldwide foreign direct investment (FD1) has grown impressively in the past 30 years. Accord­
ing to the latest World Investment Report 2004 (UNCTAD (2004)) FDI inward stock has grown 
on average at 13,1% per year between 1986 and 2003. Since the late 1980s FDI has increasingly 
taken the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) rather than greenfield investment 
(UNCTAD (2000)). At the same time concentration ratios in industries with strong horizontal 
FDI activity such as automobiles, pharmaceuticals and banking have risen (UNCTAD (1999)). 
Taken together this suggests that multinational enterprises (MNE) are increasing in size, if not 
also in efficiency.1 The impact of these multinational players is likely to be felt strongest in the 
markets they enter. Previous work has mainly examined this in the light of technology spillovers 
from the foreign to the domestic firms. However, entry by a foreign multinational enterprise 
constitutes first of all a major change in the market structure of the host country industry. This 
may induce a reaction by the domestic firms that can take the form of investment in technology, 
exit, or a domestic merger. The aim of this chapter is to emphasise this latter aspect by examin­
ing the interaction between different modes of multinational entry and the induced moves of the 
domestic firms regarding changes in market structure, R&D investment and welfare.
From the perspective of an individual multinational firm,the choice between a cross-border 
merger or acquisition and greenfield entry is ascribed to different firm characteristics (see UNC­
TAD (2000, p. 145) and Kang and Johansson (2000)). Good organisational and managerial 
skills, high advertising intensity, and the prospect of a speedy market entry are more conducive 
to M&A. Whereas a technological advantage works in favour of greenfield investment. Host 
country governments, in turn, tend to have different concerns when it comes to choose between 
these two alternatives. Often they favour greenfield investment as it is said to increase competi­
tion by adding new production capacity to the market. M&As. in contrast, are associated with a 
decrease in competition or at best with no change in market structure. However, this perception 
disregards that firms acquired by foreign investors may initiate competition with incumbents in 
the host country, for example with the help of superior technological skills from parent compa­
nies. Furthermore, if inefficient target firms which otherwise may be forced to exit are acquired 
and restructured by foreign investors, M&As may enhance competition in the host country. By 
the same token, it is possible that an initial increase in competition through greenfield entry may 
trigger domestic firms to exit or to merge. While documentation of these issues is scarce, exit is
1A number of empirical studies confirm that MNEs are, in most cases, the largest and most efficient firms in an 
industry. See Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, ch. 7.3) for an overview.
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shown to be a relevant strategy for domestic firms by De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003). They 
find that import competition as well as FDI discourage entry and stimulate exit of domestic entre­
preneurs in a sample of Belgian manufacturing firms. Accentuating the importance of research 
and development (R&D) in their analysis of Irish manufacturing, Gorg and Strobl (2003) show 
that the presence of foreign firms can also have a life-enhancing effect on domestic firms, but 
this is the case only in high-tech sectors.
Next to its original intentions the empirical literature on technology spillovers renders a closer 
look at the impact of foreign entry on changes in market structure and competition in the host 
country an interesting exercise. A difficulty with many of these papers is that the available data 
does very often not allow to divorce spillover effects from pro-competitive effects of multina­
tional presence. Gorg and Strobl (2003) ascribe their above mentioned finding of a life-enhancing 
effect on Irish firms to technology spillovers from the foreign firms in the market. However, the 
majority of the empirical studies examining horizontal spillovers finds a negative impact of for­
eign presence on domestic firms or industries (see Gorg and Greenaway (2004) for a survey). 
This suggests that the pro-competitive effects from foreign entry outweigh potential spillover 
effects at least in the short run. Sembenelli and Siotis (2005) confirm this in their study of Span­
ish manufacturing firms where they make an attempt to disentangle the pro-competitive and the 
spillover effects. They find that especially in non-R&D intensive sectors the entry of MNEs 
dampens the profit margins of local firms in the short run, to give way to efficiency-enhancing 
effects in the longer run. Overall, this suggests that the pro-competitive effects from foreign 
entry on the host country are strong and that domestic firms are more likely to be able to put up 
with them in high-tech sectors.
The theoretical literature has long treated foreign direct investment as a homogenous phe­
nomenon, where cross-border meigers and acquisitions and greenfield investment are observa- 
tionally equivalent. The focus of recent papers breaking with this tradition is mostly on the 
multinational firms’ motives for choosing one mode of entry over another accounting for host 
country characteristics, e.g. Horn and Persson (2001), Bjorvatn (2004), Eicher and Kang (2004), 
Nocke and Yeaple (2004). In the model presented here we look at i) how the MNE’s mode of 
entry choice is affected when the firms in the host country are allowed to react; ii) how this inter­
action affects market structure and iii) its impact on the level of R&D investments and welfare 
in the host country. To this end, we build a four-stage game where the MNE chooses between 
entry via acquisition of a domestic firm and greenfield investment in the first stage of the game. 
The domestic firms can react to this choice in the second stage. In the last two stages of the 
game all active firms first invest in process R&D before engaging in Cournot competition in the
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product market. Two of the issues in this chapter have been addressed before in settings with 
one incumbent in the host country. Veugelers and Vanden Houte (1990) study the impact of 
foreign competition on the innovative efforts of a domestic firm. Mukheijee (2004) looks at the 
welfare implications of greenfield versus acquisition entry in a model of foreign entry and R&D 
competition.
The assumption of an asymmetric duopoly as the initial market structure in the host country 
allows us to demonstrate that the impact of foreign entry on the host country is not independent 
of possible reactions by the local incumbents. In particular, we show that a concentrated market 
structure may result even in the case of greenfield entry when the domestic firms merge or exit 
the market as a consequence. In this way, the chapter provides an explanation for the increase in 
concentration ratios in industries where horizontal FDI is prevalent that is complementary to the 
surge in cross-border M&A as a share of FDI. Moreover, we show that a technological advan­
tage of the multinational firm only favours greenfield investment over an acquisition when either 
the domestic firms are sufficiently competitive or when they are induced to eliminate competition 
among themselves by merging. Looking at the incentives to engage in cost-reducing R&D invest­
ment in such a setting, we obtain a result that is very much in line with the empirical evidence: 
The presence of a more efficient foreign firm in the domestic market will increase total R&D 
investment in the industry. However, this comes at the cost of crowding out domestic R&D when 
compared to a situation with domestic firms only. This is in contrast to Veugelers and Vanden 
Houte (1990). In their model the less differentiated products, the less likely a negative impact 
of multinational presence on local innovative efforts. Finally, while consumer surplus increases, 
full profit repatriation on the part of the foreign firm reduces producer surplus by so much that 
domestic welfare will typically be lower after foreign entry. As the focus in this chapter is on 
competition, this should be regarded as a lower bound to domestic welfare after foreign entry.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents the components 
of the model. In Section 2.3 the model itself is addressed. First, the properties of the model 
are presented in the benchmark equilibrium without foreign entry (2.3.1); then the game with 
foreign entry is analysed (2.3.2). Section 2.4 illustrates the equilibrium market structure. Section
2.5 compares the associated R&D (2.5.1) and welfare levels (2.5.2) to the benchmark situation 
without foreign presence. Section 2.6 concludes.
Haller, Stefanie A. (2005), Multinational entry and host-country effects 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/94470
2.2 The Setup 43
2.2 The Setup
As the focus here is on the impact of the mode of foreign entry on changes in domestic market 
structure, all action will take place in one country. We look at one particular industry in this 
country. There are two domestic firms in this industry, HI  and H 2. They differ in their level of 
marginal cost, HI  is more efficient than H 2: cm  < cm-  The potential multinational entrant M  
is assumed to be more efficient than the domestic firms, its marginal cost is given by cm, where 
cm < chi < c-h2-
All firms in the market can make investments to reduce marginal cost by an amount x it Ac­
cordingly the kind of investment considered is process R&D.2 Investment is associated with a 
cost of 7xj  for all firms, where 7 measures the degree of convexity of the cost function. Convex­
ity of investment cost is ensured by 7  > | . 3
Firms are producing a homogenous good. Hence, demand is the same for all firms with the 
indirect demand function given by p =  a — Q, where a represents the size of the market and 
Q =  E ”=1 q% is the sum over all firms’ sales. For firms to produce positive levels of output, we 
need a > Ch2 > Cm > Cu > 0. The multinational’s and the domestic firms’ profits are then 
given by, respectively
Ili (qi,Xi) =  (p -  (q -  Xi)) Qi -  7x%, where i — M, HI,  H2. (2.1)
The structure of the game is outlined in Figure 2.1. In the first stage the multinational firm 
decides whether and if so how to enter the domestic market. It can either acquire one of the 
domestic firms or set up its own plant (i.e. greenfield investment).4 If the MNE decides to enter 
via an acquisition, it will make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to one of the domestic firms. Mergers 
and acquisitions are modelled here as was first done by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), that 
is the target firm is compensated for being taken over and then vanishes.5 Greenfield investment 
by the MNE is associated with a fixed cost of setting up production facilities / .
2This way of modelling R&D goes back to Brander and Spencer (1983). Investments that increase demand can 
be modelled in a similar way (see e.g. Veugelers and Vanden Houte (1990)).
3Note that this condition is stronger than the second order condition on investment. It is sufficient for the 
denominator o f profits to be positive in a situation with three (or less) active firms in the market.
4This choice of alternatives for a firm to serve a market abroad is not exhaustive, especially exports are disre­
garded for simplicity. See e.g. Bjorvatn (2004) on the latter and Buckley and Casson (1998) for a fairly comprehen­
sive treatment of possible supply modes from abroad.
5Note, however, that the assumption o f different marginal cost does not imply the Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 
(1983) result that mergers will only be profitable if they involve at least 80% o f the firms in an industry.
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M
HI, H2
(M), HI, H2
(M), HI, H2
[M, HI, H2] 
[M, H1&H2] 
[M, H1,0]
[M&H1, H2] [M&H2, HI]
[M&H1, 0]
[0, HI, H2]
In the second stage the domestic firms can react to the MNE’s decision. In the case of 
greenfield investment, entry by the MNE may induce exit or a merger among the domestic firms. 
In the case of entry via acquisition, the domestic firms can accept or reject the take-it-or-leave-it 
offer. Similarly an acquisition also has the potential to force the non-acquired firm out of the 
market.
In the third stage of the game, all active old and new entities of firms decide how much to 
invest in a cost reducing technology before engaging in Cournot competition in the last stage 
of the game. The game consists of these last two stages for the domestic firms only if the 
multinational firm decides not to enter the market. As will be detailed further in the next section, 
the notation in square brackets at the bottom of Figure 2.1 describes the resulting market structure 
outcomes. For example [0, HI, H2] states that only the two domestic firms are present in the 
market.
To understand the structure of the game and in particular the possibility of meigers and ac­
quisitions, note that we assume a competition authority in the background that follows a simple 
rule: namely to prohibit mergers or acquisitions that lead to monopoly. A final assumption is
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that whenever two firms form a new entity, they will be able to use the technology of the more 
efficient firm without additional cost, i.e. technology transfer is costless.6
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Benchmark without Foreign Entry
The situation without foreign entry, i.e. the right hand arm of Figure 2.1, is considered to be 
the initial market structure and also the benchmark. We are, hence, looking at the solution to a 
two-stage game, where the two domestic firms decide about investments in technology in the first 
stage and engage in Cournot competition in the second stage. The game is solved by backward 
induction. Equilibrium profits are given in the top part of Table 2.1 (see [0,H1,H2]). For H2 to 
produce positive quantities in equilibrium, the following condition needs to be satisfied:
D ex it  ^ 37  (a + cm) — 2a 
°m  -  2 ( 3 7 - 1 )  ' ( '
Above this threshold, H 2 will exit the market. This condition also implies that both firms have 
positive levels of investment in equilibrium.
Sales are increasing in market size a, decreasing in own initial marginal cost d,  increasing 
in the marginal cost of the competitor(s) c_<, decreasing in the technology parameter 7 , and 
decreasing in the number of active firms in the market. With the exception of c_t, the same is 
true for investment. Whether a firm’s investment level is increasing or decreasing in the maiginal 
cost of its competitor(s) depends on its efficiency relative to the average efficiency (marginal cost) 
in the market. As shown in Boone (2000), firms that are far ahead or far behind their competitors 
have the least incentives to reduce marginal cost.
2.3.2 The Model with Foreign Entry
Now the game where the MNE actually enters the host country market can be addressed. Again, 
solving by backward induction the equilibrium profits under the different entry modes of the 
MNE can be obtained as given in Table 2.1. The different market structure outcomes are ex­
plained in detail below.
6 Authors who consider technology transfer explicitly include, for example, Wang and Blomstrom (1992), Glass 
and Saggi (2002) and Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi (2004).
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______________Table 2.1: Net profits___________________
Domestic Firms only (Benchmark) 
0 »  H 1 ' H 2 ]
HI 7(»7 -  4)
H i ____________ 7 (»7 -  4) (  )  2
Greenfield Investment
_________________ [M, HU H 2]_________
m  7 (167 -  9) °-cu) y n
HI 7(167 -  9)
H2 7  (167 ~  9)
_________________ [M, HlkH'2]
M  7 (97 -  4) ) 1 -. /  ~
H l k H 2  7(g7 - 4 ) ( a t i i ^ M ^ Sd ) 2
_______________________ [A /, / / l .  0]
m  7 (9 7  -  4) ( a ^ g f £ g ,- ,* )) a -
h i  7(9 7  -  4)
H2 0
Acquisition of H ‘2
_________________ [M kH 2,  HI]
M  7 (97 -  4)
H\  7 (97 -  4)
2
H2 v2 =  mctr O- -v i'Q'v — 4) ( 37(<H-CA/-2c«2)-2(g-CH2) \ " U, 7 ^  ^ (97-2)(37-2) y
Acquisition of H 1
[ M k H  1, / / 2]
M 7 (97 -  4) _  „
HI v ('n-, /'37(o+cAi-2cwl)-2(o-ci/1) y   ^ (97-2)(37 -2) )
H2 -WO- 4) /'3'>(0+cW-2c«2)-2(a-cW2)>\ 2 7 V   ^ (97-2)(37-2) )
[ M k H l ,  0]
M 7 * 5 ^
HI f, > 7(97 -  4)
H2 0
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When the foreign firm acquires home firm H 1 for the takeover price V], there are two possible 
market structure outcomes. One in which the new joint entity of M k H l  shares the market with 
the less efficient home firm [M&H1,H2], and another one where the acquisition of H i  by the 
MNE induces H 2 to exit [M&H1,0], We assume that the competition authorities cannot fully 
observe the firms’ cost parameters and, thus, will only block mergers or acquisitions that lead 
to monopoly directly (i.e. when there are initially only two firms in the market), but not when a 
monopoly arises due to the exit of the less efficient firm after a takeover. When, instead, the MNE 
decides to acquire H 2 for the takeover price v2, the market consists of the new entity MkH'2  
and the more efficient domestic firm [M&H2,H1]. As will be shown later, exit of HI  due to the 
takeover is a theoretical possibility but will not occur in equilibrium.
If the MNE engages in greenfield investment and establishes its own plant in the host coun­
try market there are three possible market structure outcomes. One possibility is that all three 
firms are active [M,H1,H2]. The other two possibilities are that the two domestic firms merge 
[M,H1&H2] or that the less efficient domestic firm is driven out of the market [M,H1,0].
We will now analyse each of the multinational’s alternatives separately, in order to then de­
termine the equilibrium outcomes depending on parameter values. Consider first the case of 
multinational entry by acquisition.
2.3.2.1 Acquisition decision
If the MNE decides to enter the domestic market by acquisition, its choice among the domestic 
firms will depend on the cost of the target firm and on the profits under the resulting market 
structure.
Acquisition of the more efficient domestic firm HI
When the more efficient domestic firm HI  gets a take-it-or-leave-it-offer from the MNE, it will 
accept the offer for any quote that gives it at least the profits it would earn if the MNE had 
decided to take over the other domestic firm H 2, that is
^  in /i\ f  2cf/1) 2 (a Ch i ) ^
*’■ 5  7  (97 -  4) ( ---------- (97 -  2) (37  -  2)---------- )  ■ (2'3)
If HI  accepts, this leaves the MNE with net profits of — v\. It is straightforward to
show that under the assumed ranking of marginal cost ch2 > chi > cm an acquisition of HI  is 
always profitable (see also Appendix 2.A. 1.1).
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When the MNE decides to buy HI,  the condition for the less efficient domestic firm H 2 to 
leave the market becomes more stringent as compared to the situation without foreign presence 
(equation (2 .2 )):
^ 4  e x it  ^  ^ 7  i f l  “1” C h i)  2 d  ^
635 2 ( 3 7 - 1 )  '  ’
Thus, above this threshold the newly merged entity of M & H  1 will earn monopoly profits after 
compensating HI  for the takeover. These are always positive as a > cm by assumption.
In this range of parameter values the MNE could instead obtain H 2 for free (t>2 =  0). It turns 
out, however, that the monopoly outcome is more attractive for the MNE even though it has to 
compensate H I  for the takeover. In other words, the MNE prefers to pay a price to have the 
market to itself, than to share it with a competitor for free. (Proof: see Appendix 2.A.I.2.)
Acquisition of the less efficient domestic firm H 2
If, instead, the MNE makes a take-it-or-leave-it-offer to the less efficient domestic firm, H 2 will 
accept for any price that is at least as large as the profits it would earn if the MNE took over HI :
t>2 =  max 0 - -v — 4) / 37 (« +  cM -  2cH2) -  2 (a -  cH2) \ ' 
, 7 1 ' H  ( 9 7 - 2 )  ( 3 7 - 2 )  )
(2.5,
As long as t>2 is non-zero, the MNE’s profits after the takeover n j^&W2,W1 — r 2 are positive for 
Ch2 > chi > cm and ch2 < ^ ( ^ - cM+<wi)-2(2a-cM) s^ee ajso Appendix 2.A.1.3).
Note that an acquisition of H 2 by the MNE will not induce the more efficient domestic firm 
H i  to leave the market. As is demonstrated in Appendix 2.A. 1.4 the hypothetical threshold for 
HI to exit in this case lies in the region where the MNE will prefer to acquire HI.  Therefore, 
H i  will always be in the market when the MNE acquires H 2.
Acquisition of HI versus acquisition of H 2
Comparing the payoffs for the MNE under both scenarios gives the threshold above which the 
MNE will prefer to acquire HI  rather than H2\
^4 H 2vsH\  _ 972 (2a  + S c m  -  5c//i) -  247 (a + cM -  cm)  + 4a (2a -  cHi)
^  > ------------------------------- 457* -  247 + 4---------------------------------------------  (2 S)
This result states that for small values of c h 2 relative to c h \ the MNE will acquire the less 
efficient domestic firm H2. When H 2 is rather inefficient compared to H i  the MNE will acquire 
the more efficient domestic firm HI.  The intuition for this result can be obtained by looking 
at the profits after the takeover and acquisition prices. Holding everything else constant in the
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case of the acquisition of i / 1, the profits for the MNE after the takeover depend positively on 
cm2 while the price of H 1 (vi) is independent of c//2- In the case of the acquisition of i / 2, in 
contrast, the profits after the takeover for the MNE do not depend on ch2, the takeover price v2 
is, however, decreasing in ch2 '■
n M (•,c//2) -  vi(-)
+
iljVf (•) — V2V,Ch2)
The MNE’s net profits from a takeover of either of the domestic firms are increasing in c# 2 
over the relevant range of parameter values. As the profits from an acquisition of HI ( H ^ 111'112) 
and the takeover price for H2 (v2 =  Ilj^ f//1W2) are the profits of two firms in the same market, 
it is sufficient to look at the direct effect of a change in ch2- Taking derivatives it is not difficult 
to show that this direct effect is stronger on the MNE’s profits after a takeover of HI  than on v2. 
Ceteris paribus the larger ch2 - that is the less efficient H2 relative to HI  - the more likely that 
the MNE buys HI.  Put simply, in order to eliminate as much competition as possible the MNE 
would always like to acquire HI,  however, there are instances when it can only afford i / 2.7
As the upper bound on the profitability of a takeover of H 2 is larger than the threshold 
obtained in equation (2.6), a takeover of H2 will always be profitable for the MNE up to the 
threshold above which it prefers to acquire HI.  Note from above that we need not worry about 
the profitability of a takeover of HI  as this is profitable over the whole range of parameter values.
2.3.2.2 Greenfield decision
With greenfield entry by the MNE the number of firms in the market increases and so the con­
dition for the less efficient domestic firm to stay in the market is more stringent than in the 
acquisition case (cf. equation (2.4)). H 2 will exit the market above
j g  exit  ^  4 7  ( a  +  c m  +  C h i ) - 3 a
>  3 ( 4 7 - 1 )  ' ( '
Under greenfield entry, a merger among the domestic firms may become possible. While 
the competition authority would have blocked a merger to monopoly in a situation with the two
7Note that the threshold implied by equation (2.6) is not necessarily larger than cw i . Thus when cM is large 
relative to c m ,  the MNE may be able to afford HI  over the whole range of parameter values.
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domestic firms only, entry by the MNE may now induce the authorities to look at such a merger 
more favourably. A merger among the domestic firms HI  and H2 will be profitable if their joint 
profits after the merger are larger than the sum of their individual profits in the absence of a 
merger: + n ^ 2HiH2. The implied threshold for a domestic merger to
be profitable cj^merffer is given in Appendix 2.A. 1.5 as it is very long and does not provide any 
intuition.
2.3.2.3 Greenfield versus Acquisition
For the comparison between greenfield investment and a foreign acquisition, the dimension con­
sidered so far, namely the marginal cost of the ‘pivotal’ firm H'2 is not sufficient. While acqui­
sitions by the MNE and the reactions of the domestic firms depend on marginal cost only, for 
greenfield investment the fixed cost of setting up a plant /  also plays a role. The MNE’s profits 
net of takeover prices or fixed cost as given in Table 2.1 need to be compared to obtain a full 
characterisation of market structure outcomes. The thresholds for ch2 computed above deter­
mine which of the respective greenfield and acquisition alternatives have to be compared. The 
next section presents graphical illustrations of the equilibrium structures under different parame­
ter combinations.
2.4 Equilibrium
In order to separate the market structure outcome of the game from the additional effect of cost 
reducing R&D, we first assume that R&D investment is infinitely costly, that is 7  =  oc. This 
amounts to analysing the game in Figure 2.1 without R&D investment in the third stage.8 Fixing 
a =  4, cm — 1, chi = 1-2 (and 7  =  00) the equilibrium outcomes can be represented in / ,  ch2- 
space as given in Figure 2.2. The choice of parameter values allows for a rich set of market 
structure outcomes, as market size is relatively large compared to the firms’ marginal costs.
The domestic firm H2 is by assumption less efficient than Hi  (c/ /2 > Chi), therefore, atten­
tion can be constrained to values of ch2 larger than ch\ =  1.2. The upper bound for the field 
of action is given by the condition for H2 to be in the market when the domestic firms are in 
the market alone (equation (2.2)), that is here equal to c%fXit =  2 .6 . The vertical loci in the 
Figure represent the thresholds for ch2 computed above. The non-vertical lines are obtained by
*Note that this reduces the equilibrium profits given in Table 2.1 to those o f a Cournot game with two or three 
asymmetric firms.
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comparing profits of the relevant greenfield and acquisition alternatives as given in Table 2.1 and 
solving for the fixed cost of greenfield investment / .
Assuming the fixed cost of greenfield investment /  to be equal to zero, we move along the 
horizontal ch2 — axis from left to right. Close to the origin, that is, when H 2 is almost as 
efficient as H i,  we observe an area where the MNE engages in greenfield investment and the 
two domestic firms stay in the market independently. For values of CH2 above d^f™TgeT, the less 
efficient domestic firm H 2 would only capture a small share of the market. By merging the two 
domestic firms are able to increase their profit as one firm with marginal cost cm  above the sum 
of their individual profits. For values of c#2 to the right of c ^ xtt greenfield investment by the 
MNE will induce H'2 to exit the market.
For values of ch2 up to where the diagonal line meets the horizontal axis, the MNE will 
engage in greenfield investment; for values of ch2 above that, it will prefer to acquire H I. In this 
range, H 2 is such an inefficient competitor that the MNE can afford to buy out the more efficient 
domestic firm HI and still eam higher profits than if it were sharing the market with H I, as 
would be the case under greenfield investment. In a situation where H 2 is very inefficient even 
the acquisition of H 1 will induce it to exit the market and create a monopoly for the MNE. This 
is the case for values of c#2 laiger than
Next consider a move along the vertical axis, that is a situation when both domestic firms have 
identical marginal cost (c//2 =  c-h i). For low values of fixed setup cost /  we observe greenfield 
investment with both domestic firms in the market while, for larger values of / ,  acquiring H I  
is more profitable. The diagonal locus compares the MNE’s profits under greenfield investment 
with both domestic firms in the market to those under an acquisition of H2. Below this threshold 
the MNE shares the profits with two other firms in the market and has to cover the fixed setup 
cost, whereas above it, it has to pay the takeover price to acquire H 2, but then only shares the 
market with H I. Greenfield investment is profitable up to higher values of fixed setup cost when 
it induces the domestic firms to merge (to the right of c%£neTger). In fact, when comparing the 
MNE’s profits under an acquisition of H2 to those under greenfield investment with only one 
efficient domestic firm in the market along the curved locus /  is exactly equal to the takeover 
price for H 2.
We now turn to investigate the situation with R&D investment. Figure 2.3 depicts the equi­
librium market structure for the same parameters as in Figure 2.2 but now 7 = 3  rather than 
infinity. First note that the field of action contracts, that is c ^ f x%t is lower than above. The same 
observation is also true for all other thresholds; the R&D stage introduces fiercer competition to 
the game. Given the way R&D investment is modelled, the multinational, as the most efficient
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium market structure without investment
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium market structure with investment
parameters: a — 4, cM =  1, cH\ = 1.2, 7 =  3
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firm, also benefits the most from investing to reduce its marginal cost. This distorts the market 
structure in favour of the MNE. For example H 2 can be more efficient than above and the MNE 
will still be able to afford H I. In fact, greenfield investment in this case is no longer profitable 
up to the level of cn2, where the less efficient domestic firm would choose to exit the market.
Summarising the insights of these figures one obtains the following: First, the threshold for 
the less efficient domestic firm to exit is lower under either form of foreign presence than in its 
absence. This reflects a finding by De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) who show that the inflow 
of FDI increases domestic exit rates in a sample of Belgian manufacturing firms.
Second, while it is often held that greenfield investment is more likely when the MNE has 
a technological advantage, this is not the case per se in this setting. A technological advantage 
alone is not sufficient. Greenfield investment here is an attractive choice for the MNE in two 
cases. One is when the domestic firms are both rather competitive relative to the MNE. The 
reason for this is that when all three firms have similar levels of marginal cost, their profits are 
close to those in an equilibrium with symmetric firms, and hence an acquisition of either of the 
domestic firms becomes very expensive for the MNE.9 In the other case, that is when the domes­
tic firms react by merging, greenfield entry is attractive because the reduction in competition is 
without cost for the MNE; it only has to incur the cost of setting up a plant.
The third result concerns the MNE’s choice of takeover target. In principle, the MNE would 
always like to acquire the more efficient domestic firm H I  in order to eliminate the stronger 
competitor. However, as long as the MNE’s and the domestic firms’ marginal costs are not 
too different, it will only be able to afford the weaker domestic firm H 2.10 Empirically, at 
least the first observation is in line with Harris and Robinson (2002), who using a sample of 
UK manufacturing plants, demonstrate that foreign acquirers have higher productivity levels (as 
measured by total factor productivity) and that they buy the most productive domestic plants.
’ Applying a differentiated products interpretation to a Hotelling model, Eicher and Kang (2004) obtain a differ­
ent result. They show that high degrees o f competition (i.e. little product differentiation) reduce the likelihood that 
the MNE coexists with the local firm, as entry by the more efficient MNE drives the domestic firm out of the market.
10These results have to be compared to recent models of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in a general 
equilibrium context. In Neary (2004) trade liberalisation may lead to cross-border merger waves with low-cost 
home (foreign) firms buying up high-cost foreign (home) firms.
In Nocke and Yeaple ( 2004) cross-border M&A involve either the most or the least efficient active firms depending 
on whether firms differ in their mobile or non-mobile capabilities. In an industry where firms differ in mobile factors 
(i.e. technology), the most efficient firms engage in cross-border M&A, less efficient firms engage in greenfield FDI, 
while the least efficient active firms export. In an industry where firms differ in immobile capabilities the ranking of 
choices for the most efficient to least efficient firms is greenfield FDI, exports, cross-border M&A.
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Finally, with R&D in the model, the pressure on the domestic firms is stronger. It permits the 
MNE, as the most efficient firm, to achieve a position in the market where it faces relatively little 
competition over a wider range of parameter values than in the situation without R&D.
2.5 R&D Investment and Welfare
Having analysed the impact of R&D on the equilibrium market structure, we now turn to com­
paring investment levels and welfare in a situation with the MNE in the market to the benchmark 
situation with domestic firms only.
2.5.1 R&D Investment
Table 2.2 provides the R&D levels associated with the different market structures for each firm 
individually and at the industry level. The right column of Table 2.2 compares the investment 
under the benchmark situation with domestic firms only to that under the different market struc­
tures. One can see that the presence of a more efficient foreign firm in the market results in a 
higher total level of investment targeted at the domestic market for all market structures other 
than the monopoly case. Not surprisingly, a monopolist has little incentive to invest.
Note, however, that entry of the more efficient multinational firm in most cases leads to the 
extinction of at least one of the domestic firms. As firms’ investment levels are decreasing in 
own marginal cost and increasing in their competitors’ marginal cost, a more efficient firm in the 
market reduces their R&D spending. This can also be seen from Table 2.2, where we see that 
R&D investment of the domestic firms is higher in the benchmark case than under any of the 
market structures where the MNE is in the market. Hence, investment by the MNE crowds out 
R&D investment by the domestic firm(s).
These results are in line with empirical findings by various authors: Lipsey (2002) in a survey 
of home country effects of FDI concludes that overall productivity is improved by the presence 
of foreign-owned operations. Concerning the innovative efforts of domestic firms, Veugelers 
and Vanden Houte ( 1990) find them to be reduced by foreign presence in a sample of Belgian 
manufacturing firms, - especially when products are not so differentiated as is the case here. For 
small Venezuelan enterprises, Aitken and Harrison (1999) show that foreign equity participation 
is positively correlated with plant productivity, whereas foreign investment negatively affects the 
productivity of domestically owned firms. Finally, Driffield (2001), in a sample of UK man­
ufacturing firms, estimates inward investment to stimulate productivity growth in the domestic
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Table 2.2: Investment levels
Investment Comparison to Benchmark*
Dom estic Firm s only (Benchmark)
[0, H l ,  H 2]
H I
m
total
O &7 (°~ icU l +c Hi) -2  (a-cjj 1) 
(97-2X3-Y-2)
O 37(o+c//i—2ch2 )-2(a-CH2) 
(97-2)(37-2)
97—2
-
Greenfield Investment
[ M ,  H l ,  H 2 ]
M 47(0—3cm +CH1+CH2)—3 (a—cm) (167-3X47-3)
(6O72--857+30)o-f-(-32472+2887-48)^
H I 47(o+cm —3ch i +CH2)~ 3(o—c m ) (167-3)(47-3)
7'
(20472
-l(167-3)(47-3)(&7-2)(37-2) + 
- 13l7+12)cHi+(6072 - 727+6)cH2 ^
•V"
(6O72-
-i(167-3)(47-3)(97-2)(37-2) > U 
-857+30)a+(-32472 +2887-48 )cm
H 2 47 (a+CM +CH i -  3cH2 )-3(o-c W2) (167-3)(47-3) (6O72-
(167-3)(47-3)(97-2)(37-2) 1
-727+6)c^ x + ^ 20472—1317H-12)ch2  ^ n
total o3a-cM-CHi-CH2
(167-3)(47-3)(97-2)(37-2) ^ v 
(17o-27cM+5cKi+5cff2)7-6(o-CM)  ^ n
°  167-3 (167-3)(97-2) ^  v
[M, H l k H 2 ]  or [A i, H I , 0]
M
H l ( k H 2 )
total
37(o-2ca/+chi )—2 (o-cm ) 
(97-2)(37-2) 
37(a+cjtf-2c// i ) - 2  (o-cjj i ) CH2~~CM n
(97-2X37-2) 
X »7-2
(97-2)(37-2) > U
cm — C//2  < 0
Acquisition  o f  H 2
[ M & f f 2 , //l]
M
H I
H 2
total
37(o-2ca/+cWi )—2(0—cm ) 
(97-2)(37-2) 
37(o+cm—2ch j)-2(o—cpi) CH2-CM n
(97-2)(37—2) 
0
0 2a—cm—cj,i 
^ 97-2
0
(97-2)(37-2) > U 
137(a+cn 1—2c{¡2 )—2 (a—Cff2 )  ^ «L (97-2)07-2) ^  U 
CM — CH2 < 0
Acquisition  o f  H I
[A/&//1, //2]
M
HI
H2
total
37(o-2cm +CH2 )-2(o-cm ) 
(97-2)(37-2)
0
37 (o+c*( -  2c h  2 )-2(a-cjj2)
21 37 (0— 2cm +CH2 ) — 2(o—Cff 1 ) ^(97-2)(37-2) ^  U 
ch i ~cm n
(97-2X37-2) 
o 2o-cjh— c//2 
 ^ 97-2
(97-2)(37-2) ^  u
cm — chi < 0
[M kH  1, 0]
M
H l, H2 
total
°~CM
47-1
0
O -C M
92a-cÄ1-cii2 ^  ^ 
7(7a+9cAf-8cjj1-8ctf2)-2(a+CAf-cin-Cff2)  ^ A
47-1 (47-1X97-2)
2 _  structure] ^  . =  ^
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sector by around 0.75% per annum. He argues that this is a result of the productivity advan­
tage exhibited by foreign firms and that it cannot be attributed to investment or output spillovers. 
Moreover, he finds that foreign R&D appears to crowd out domestic R&D with a negligible 
effect on domestic productivity.
2.5.2 Welfare
The welfare levels associated with the different market structure outcomes are given in Table 
2.3. Comparing the situation with two domestic firms only to any situation with foreign presence, 
welfare in the host country is higher without the MNE in the market (see Appendix 2.A.3). While 
there are efficiency gains due to foreign entry that result in higher consumer surplus, the MNE 
is able to fully convert its superior efficiency into profits and extract them to the detriment of the 
host country under any possible market structure outcome.
This result should not be used to demonise any form of foreign direct investment, rather it 
can be considered as a lower bound to host country welfare. Very often, host countries are able to 
benefit substantially from the presence of multinationals. Most easily this will be the case if the 
MNE does not fully repatriate its profits, but reinvests some of the earnings in the host country. 
Host countries may further benefit from MNEs under their jurisdiction through taxation, training 
of local workers, technology spillovers, and creation of employment.
From Table 2.3 it is also straightforward to see that the host country would not necessarily 
make itself better off by banning foreign entry by acquisition: welfare under an acquisition of 
H2 [M&H2,H1] is higher than welfare under greenfield entry with the domestic firms merging 
[M,Hl&H2].n
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter analyses the impact of entry mode and presence of a foreign firm on the firms 
in a host country. While the prevailing literature is concentrated on technology or productivity 
spillovers, we focus on the effects stemming from foreign competition. In particular, we examine 
changes in market structure when the domestic firms do not stay idle after foreign entry. We also 
investigate how the interaction between a multinational entrant and the domestic firms affects 
R&D investments and welfare.
u Mukheijee (2004) obtains a similar result in a setting with one local incumbent only.
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While much of the increase in concentration ratios in industries where horizontal FDI is 
prevalent can certainly be ascribed to the surge in cross-border mergers and acquisitions over 
the last decade or more, this chapter offers a complementary explanation. We argue that this 
can also be due to domestic firms merging or exiting the market as a reaction to foreign entry. 
Moreover, with the chosen setup it is possible to demonstrate that foreign entry may in fact make 
it desirable and feasible for domestic incumbents to merge. In turn, anticipating this kind of 
anti-competitive reaction a multinational considering to enter the market may prefer to set up its 
own plant (greenfield investment) to an acquisition of a local firm. When this sort of strategic 
interaction is combined with cost-reducing R&D investments by all active firms, a technological 
advantage of the MNE translates into higher R&D investment at the industry level. However, 
this comes at the cost of crowding out R&D investment by the domestic firm(s).
Regarding welfare, the model allows us to derive a lower bound to host country welfare after 
foreign entry. Entry of a more efficient foreign firm enhances consumer surplus. However, even 
if both domestic firms are present in the market after multinational entry, their profits are greatly 
reduced. This is due to the focus on competition which does not account for the possibilities of 
host countries to extract rents from multinational firms. A possible extension of the model is to 
compare the welfare outcomes of different policies towards MNEs and domestic firms in detail.
These results provide an intuitive explanation for a recurrent finding in the empirical litera­
ture on spillover effects, namely that foreign presence has a negative impact on the productivity 
of domestic firms. As suggested by Sembenelli and Siotis (2005) these pro-competitive effects 
are likely to be short-run phenomena, while technology spillovers and efficiency gains through 
multinationals take longer to materialise. Along somewhat different lines, Markusen and Ven­
ables (1999) emphasise the potential of backward and forward linkages created by multinationals 
to offset the possibility of foreign firms substituting for domestic production.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Takeover Profitability and Related Thresholds 
2.A.1.1 Profitability of a takeover of H I:
Solving -  v, > 0 yields cm  < - 3^ ^ - cm-2cH^ + 2( ^ -cm-cHi) md
ch 2 > Both of these potential thresholds are dominated by the assumed
structure of marginal cost c#2 > chi > cm , as
CH2 <  _  Ch i  =  _ 9 g 2  ( c m  _  C u )  <  o
and
C m  >  -  C H1 =  - 2 ^ 2  (2a -  c „  -  C H ,) <  0
2.A.1.2 Acquiring 7/1 when it is optimal for H 2 not to supply the market versus incorpo­
rating H ‘2 for free
To compare the profits of the MNE when it becomes a monopolist after the acquisition of HI as 
H 2 exits to incorporating H2 for free, we can write
M ~ Vl ~  “  °J
  ( o - c m ) 2 _  (Q~, _  [ / 3 7 (o -H c A /-2 c g i) -2 (o -C fli)  \ 2 , / '¿y(a—2cM + c H i ) - 2 ( q + c m ) \ 2  ^ (2 * 8 )
-  4*y—1 ' V y 7  V  ^  ( 9 7 - 2 ) ( 3 7 - 2 )  J  V (9 7 -2 )(3 -y -2 ) ,/
Taking the derivative w.r.t. cm
_  7 ( o ( l6 2 7 3-2 8 8 7 2 + 1 6 8 7 - 3 2 ) + c M (6487 î -5 0 4 7 2+9&7)+CH2 ( - 8 1 0 7 3+79272 - 2 6 4 7 + 3 2 ) )
— 72974-  12967s + 79272 -1 9 2 7 + 1 6
The coefficients on a and ch2 sum to the negative of the coefficient on cm , hence this expression 
is decreasing in ch\- When cm  approaches its upper bound a12, we have:
n " * “ -  ( 'n “ " 2 " 1 -  =  8 9 1 -)» -6 9 3 ^ + 1327 - 4  2 _  3
"  I V "  2 J (97 — 2) (37  — 2) (47 — 1)
12Note that 2.8 does not depend on cm2-
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Therefore, it is never profitable for the MNE to incorporate H 2 for free, when it can become a 
monopolist by acquiring H I.
2.A.1.3 Profitability of a costly takeover of H 2
Solving U ^ H2Hi -  v2 > 0, where v2 = 7  (97 -  4) ) 2 yields
3 7 (3c m —  2 c / n )  — 2cm ^ ^  3 7 (2 a  — cm  +  Chi) —  2 (2 a  — c i )
2 (3 7 ^ )  - C m ~  •
The lower bound is less stringent than the assumed structure of marginal cost cm  > cm  > cm- 
37  (3c m —  2c / / i )  -  2cm 9^ — 2
---------2 ( 3 ^ T j ------------ CH1 =  “ 2 (3 T ^T ) (Cff' “  Cm) < ° '
Therefore, acquiring H2 will be profitable for any value of cy2 between cm  > cm  > cm and
^  37(2o- caì+c«j)-2(2o- cw)
2 < ----------2(3^!)---------- •
Note that this upper bound is larger than the threshold for a takeover of H I to be more 
profitable than a takeover of H2 (cff2HlvsH2):
37 (2a—cm +cjj i ) -2(2a - cm ) _  972(2a+8c, -^5cwi )—24-y{a+CM—cm )+4o(2a-c»i)
2(37-1) 4572- 247+4
=  2(3~~imS ^ 2- 247^ )  K18^2 -  127) a -  (3672 -  367 +  4) cM + (4572 -  247 +  4) cm ] .
The coefficients on a and ch 2 add up to the coefficient to cm■ Hence, given that we have assumed 
a > C-H2 > cm this term is always larger than zero.
2.A.1.4 A takeover of H 2 will never induce H I to leave the market
The threshold for H I to exit the market when H2 is taken over is c ^ f xU > |j~2° • Solving
solving equation (2 .6 ) for cm  instead of cll2 yields
ji_H\vsH2 = 972 (2a + Scm -  5cH2) -  247 (a +  cM + cH2) -  4 (2a -  cfJ2)
m  (37 -  1) (4572 -  247 + 4)
Comparing the two
A_exii A  HlvsH'2  
CH1 ~  CH1
_  (2773+1872-367+8)a-(27&73 +21672 +367)cAi + (27073-23472+727-8)c//2 ^ n
— 2(37—1)(457*—247+4) >
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Under given assumptions this term is always larger than zero, as the coefficients on a and ch2 
add up to the coefficient on cm- H I will, therefore, always be in the market when the MNE 
acquires H  2 .
2.A.1.5 Threshold for a merger among the domestic firms in the case of greenfield invest­
ment by the MNE
D_merger   32 7 2 (a+CM + 3 c jj i ) —I2 ‘r{3a+CM+2cm )+9a
2 — 160-y--7 2 7 + 9
-I---------------- (167~3>-----,--------- -v/7 (16t — 9) *(167—9){97—2)(37—2)(1607'2—727+9) V I \ lyj I ^ )- i
z  =  207367e (a + cm — 2chi)2 — 14475 (391a + 415cm — 806c//i) (a +  cm — 2cm ) 
+2474 (a (2195a + 5171cAi -  9561cm ) + 2442c|f -  10055cMcm  + 9 8 0 8 ^ )  
- 7 3 (17a (839a + 3840cw -  5518cH1) +  26016^ -  117312cMcWi +  1 0 5 5 5 9 ^ ) 
- 72 (a (6511a -  19330cA/ +  6308cm ) -  5 9 2 1 ^  -  31172cmcw1 + 1 8 7 4 0 ^ )  
+127  (11a (34a — '29cm — 39cj/i) — ö lc^  + A21cmChi +
—36 (a — Cf/i) (19a — 12caî — 7c/n)
where
(2.9)
2.A.2 Derivatives of Net Acquisition Profits
d n M&Wl.W2 
5^  n M
H2
dem  ^  2?72 -  247 + 4
(a. — ch2) > 0
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2.A.3 Welfare
Having a close look at Table 2.3 allows us to rank unambiguously two market structures accord­
ing to the associated welfare levels for all parameters right away:
Welfare when the MNE buys H'2 is larger than when it engages in greenfield investment with one 
domestic firm in the market and it is also larger than welfare under an acquisition of H 1 when 
H2 remains in the market.
We use the dominated welfare level of greenfield investment with one domestic firm and 
compare it to the monopoly outcome. It is sufficient to base the comparison on consumer surplus 
as producer surplus in the case of w M'HX&lH2 cancels with the acquisition price under
QgM.HlSiH2 _  QgM&Hl#
_  n,.2 [2a-cM-CH1f  _  <? 2 {a-cHi)2
^  2(97—2 f  ’  (47—1 )a
_  (67(7q— 2j/i)—10a+7cAf+3cjyi)(6'y(q-fCAf — 2cf/i)—2q-“Ca/ +3cffj)
2 ( » 7 - 2 ) - ( 4 7 - l ) 2
This expression is equal to or larger than zero for chi < — '6~>~1). By definition the 
largest value cm  can take is CH2 - If both domestic firms have identical marginal cost, the exit 
threshold in a situation with domestic firms only applies to both firms equally and becomes 
c%fxit =  <%*** — a. The condition on cm  (=  cH2) derived above is larger than a :
2a(3'y-l)+CAf (6 7 — 1) ^D jex i t
4 7 - 1  CH1
_  2 o (3 7 -1 )+ cm (6 7 -1 ) _  „  _  o (2 7 -1 )+ c m (6 7 -1 ) n  
~  4 7 -1  4 7 -1
Hence, welfare under greenfield investment with one domestic firm in the market is larger than 
under the monopoly outcome over the whole range of parameter values.
It remains to establish that welfare in a purely domestic setting is larger than the two un­
dominated results with foreign presence, namely W M Hi H2 and \ y M&iH2,Hi comparison 
between and Can be simplified.13 It is sufficient to consider a situation with
symmetric firms and without investment. Welfare in a situation without foreign presence is given
13Note that the sum of total sales in a market (and, therefore, also profits) with n asymmetric firms ordered 
according to marginal cost c\ <  ... < d  <  ... <  c„ will never be larger than the sum of total sales in a market with 
n  symmetric firms with marginal cost c\ : £ " =1 9» =  ^ <  £ ”=1 Qi =  --- f f i 1
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by
w V.m.m\ c s  +  P S
=  |  ( a  -  c )2 +  £ (a  -  c )2 +  |  ( a  -  c )2 =  |  ( a  -  c )2 .
Welfare under greenfield with the two domestic firms in the market is given by
W \M,H\,H2\  _  C S  +  p S
= ¿ ( a - c )2 + ¿ ( « - c )2 + ^ ( a - c )2 =  =  § ( a - c ) 2 .
As |  > | |  we have shown that w V , h i , h 2  >  ^ m , h i M 2
The crucial parameter for the comparison between W 9M 1H 2  and js CHl When
c h i  is largest ( c m ) welfare will be highest under both scenarios, whereas the opposite is true 
at its minimum c h 2 . Hence, we need to show that H,r0 /il,jW2 — > 0 within these
boundaries. At c m  =  c m
|/j/0,W1,W2 _  y^rM&iH2.H\
_  3 7 2(cH 3-C M )(8l72(cf/2 -C A /)-H 2 7(2 o + 3cM -5c H 2 )-'*(4 o -c ^ — Sch2))
~  2 ( 9 7 -2 ) a( 3 7 - 2 ) '
This expression is nonnegative for c h 2 >  cm- At c h i  =  CH2
i y 9 . H l . H 2  _  y \ rMkH2,H\
_  C M )(37(4o+5cA f-9ca2)—2(4a-3cM +7cH 2))
2 ( 3 7 - 2 ) u(9 7 -2 )  *
This expression is nonnegative between Cm <  c h 2 <  37 (4.^ ± ^ | k j M?. This upper bound is 
smaller than the upper bound for a takeover o f H 2 (c^r2HlvsH2) solved at c m  =  c H2 :
37(4o-|-5cAf)—2(4a-f3cjtf)   ^ A _ H lvsH 2 \
27y—14 H  2 'CH1—CH2
__ 37(4o-f5cAf )-2(4o-|-3cAf) __ 972 (q-f4cm ) — 127'(a-h^M) +4o
2?7—14 4572 —247+4
< w _  X ( 3 3 7 2- 4 ) ( 3 7 - 2 )  ^  n
— -3 ( a  Cm )  (45^2_247 + 4)(27 7 - 14) >
Therefore, welfare in a situation with two domestic firms in the market is larger than welfare in a 
situation where the MNE buys H  2 and shares the market with H I  within the range of parameter 
values where a takeover of H 2  is profitable for the MNE.
With the above rankings for welfare levels we have also established that welfare will always 
be highest without foreign presence.
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Chapter 3
Foreign Firms and Host-Country Productivity: 
Does the Mode of Foreign Entry Matter?
- joint with Ragnhild Balsvik*
Abstract
We examine the contributions of foreign entrants to productivity growth as well as 
their impact on the productivity of domestic plants in a panel of Norwegian manu­
facturing firms. A large share of overall productivity growth is generated by foreign 
plants. This includes, in particular, contributions from foreign acquisitions.
In contrast, the impact of foreign presence on the productivity of domestic plants is 
negative. We investigate this further by distinguishing between foreign greenfield 
entry and foreign entry by acquisition. We find that foreign acquisitions have a 
positive effect on the productivity of domestic plants, while the impact of greenfield 
entry is negative.
Norwegian School o f Economics and Business Administration, Bergen
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3.1 Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have come to play an important role in global production. Em­
pirical evidence confirms that foreign-owned firms typically are larger, more productive, more 
capital- and research-intensive and pay higher wages than their domestically owned counter­
parts.1 Foreign ownership of firms in a host economy can come about by greenfield entry or 
by foreign acquisition of assets in existing domestic firms. Greenfield entry, by adding new 
production capacity, may increase competition in the host market, while foreign acquisitions of 
host country firms are more likely to leave the degree of competition unchanged in the short run 
(UNCTAD (2000)). In addition, foreign firms are often viewed as a source of externalities for 
domestic firms, with the channels ranging from knowledge externalities over pecuniary exter­
nalities to competition effects. To the extent that domestic firms acquired by foreign owners are 
more integrated in the host country economy than new start-ups, the amount of such spillovers 
might also depend on the mode of entry.
Multinationals affect firm-level performance in the host country through two main routes 
(Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004)). The first route is a compositional effect; if MNEs are 
different from domestic firms in one or more dimensions, a higher share of foreign firms will 
change aggregate performance in the host economy along those dimensions. Secondly, as indi­
cated above, foreign firms may also affect the performance of domestic firms by changing their 
behaviour (spillover or competition effect). Using total factor productivity (TFP) as a measure 
of firm performance, the aim of this chapter is to investigate aspects of both the compositional 
effect and the spillover effect in Norwegian manufacturing. Our focus is in particular on the entry 
of foreign firms, considering separately the effects of greenfield entry and foreign acquisitions.
To examine these two effects we draw on two different strands of the literature. We study 
the compositional effect by adapting an approach that has focused on the impact of entry and 
exit on productivity growth by changing the composition of firms in an industry, in most cases 
irrespective of their ownership. Such productivity decompositions calculate the contributions 
of entering, exiting and surviving firms to productivity growth in a country. Somewhat different 
methods have been proposed by Griliches and Regev (1995), Baily et al. (1992), Olley and Pakes 
(1996) and Haltiwanger (1997) and applied to mainly US data. In a recent cross-country analysis, 
Bartelsman et al. (2004)also summarise the evidence from earlier country-specific studies. Two 
earlier essays examine the contributions from foreign and domestic firms to productivity growth,
1 Most of the existing evidence is from manufacturing. See Barba Navaretti and Venables ( 2004 ) for a survey of 
empirical evidence.
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namely Okamoto and Sjeholm (1999) for Indonesia and De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) for 
Belgium.
More or less explicitly, the productivity decomposition studies suggest that much of the pro­
ductivity growth in surviving plants might be due to the entry of new and efficient firms that 
increase competitive pressure (see Bartelsman et al. (2004)). Olley and Pakes (1996), Disney 
et al. (2003) and Nickell (1996) examine this further, but do not take into account the role of 
foreign entry. Aghion et al. (2004) look at the impact of foreign entry on productivity growth in 
UK manufacturing, though they do not distinguish between different modes of foreign entry.
The literature that looks at the effects of foreign presence on host country firms has not 
considered newly entering foreign firms, but rather measures of overall foreign presence. This 
spillover literature is surveyed in Gorg and Greenaway (2004) and Gorg and Strobl (2001). The 
evidence on spillovers is mixed; recent contributions that uncover positive productivity spillovers 
are by Keller and Yeaple (2003) for the US and by Haskel et al. (2002) for the UK. Earlier work 
by Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Konings (2001) provides evidence of a negative spillover 
effect for Indonesia and Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, respectively. This negative impact is 
attributed to a market stealing or competition effect.
We contribute to both the decomposition studies and the spillover literature by introducing the 
distinction between foreign acquisitions and greenfield investment as two different modes of for­
eign entry. While De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003), as well as Okamoto and Sjeholm (1999), 
distinguish between foreign and domestic firms in their productivity decompositions, we intro­
duce a further distinction, namely that of foreign acquisitions. Our results show that along with 
the increase in foreign ownership in Norway, the contribution to productivity growth generated 
by foreign plants has also increased substantially. Most of the productivity growth in the manu­
facturing sector is generated within surviving plants, both domestic and foreign. By the 1990s, a 
substantial contribution comes from plants acquired by foreign owners, even though these plants 
do not have above average productivity at the time of acquisition. Greenfield entrants, in turn, 
are more productive upon entry but too few in number to contribute to productivity growth more 
than proportionally.
While the spillover literature has considered foreign direct investment (FDI) as a homogenous 
phenomenon, using measures such as the share of output or employment in foreign-owned firms, 
we focus on foreign entrants, differentiating between greenfield and acquisition FDI. Using an 
augmented production function approach similar to the spillover literature, our analysis suggests 
that the negative overall effect of foreign presence in Norway is mostly due to foreign entry, 
while acquisitions seem to enhance the productivity of domestic plants. Moreover, greenfield
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entry is associated with competition effects which are not discernible for foreign acquisitions. 
These results are robust to a number of different specifications.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe data sources 
and define entry, exit and foreign ownership. The Section also gives an overview of the devel­
opment of foreign ownership and foreign entry in Norwegian manufacturing. We illustrate our 
TFP measure in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the decomposition of total factor productiv­
ity growth into the contributions from foreign and domestic entrants, survivors and exitors. In 
Section 3.5 we analyse the direct impact from greenfield entry and entry by acquisition on the 
productivity of the domestic firms. Section 3.6 briefly concludes.
3.2 Data Sources and Exposition
3.2.1 The Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics
Our main data is the annual census of all manufacturing plants in Norway collected by Statistics 
Norway. The Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics are collected at the plant level, where the 
plant is defined as a functional unit at a single physical location, engaged mainly in activities 
within a specific activity group. The plant-level variables include, among other things, detailed 
information on production, input use, investment, location, and industry classification.2 We use 
the ISIC Rev. 2 classification in our analysis.3
We drop plants defined as small all their life, plants with less than 8 employees all their life, 
and observations of plants not in ordinary production (service units or plants under construction). 
The resulting large plant sample contains 150 000 observations and 10 400 plants for the period
1978-2001. In terms of employment and output, the large plant sample still contains more than 
90% of total manufacturing output and employment.
2The information for small plants (defined as having less than 5 or 10 employees) comes mainly from adminis­
trative registers and is therefore less extensive than for large plants. In particular, there is no investment information 
for small plants, which means that we are unable to construct TFP measures for this group.
3 For more detailed descriptions o f the Manufacturing Statistics, see the documentation in Halvorsen et al. (1991 ), 
and the annual publications from Statistics Norway (Manufacturing Statistics), where the aggregate results from the 
census are published.
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3.2.2 The SIFON Register
Information about foreign ownership for the period 1990-2001 is obtained from the SIFON- 
register, which is a record of foreign ownership of equity in Norwegian firms. The SIFON- 
register contains information about the value and share of equity held by the largest foreign 
owner of the firm, the total share of equity held by foreign owners and the country of the largest 
owner.4 It was initiated in 1972, and recorded only direct foreign ownership before 1990, while 
from 1990 indirect foreign ownership has also been included in the register.5
Before 1990, our information about foreign ownership is from the Manufacturing Statistics 
where plants are classified into three ownership classes: plants that are part of firms where less 
than 20%, 20-50%, or more than 50% of equity is foreign-owned. Since this information is 
obtained from the SIFON register, it means that only direct foreign ownership is included. We 
have chosen to treat indirect and direct foreign ownership equally after 1990, which means that 
we classify plants as foreign-owned when either the direct or the indirect foreign ownership of 
equity is above the 20% threshold.6
It is not unlikely that registration of indirect foreign ownership in 1990 was particularly low 
as this was the first year this type of foreign ownership was recorded. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
development of foreign ownership among large plants in Norwegian manufacturing from 1978 
to 2001. Indirect and direct foreign ownership is combined after 1990, and hence, in 1991 the 
curve for the share of plants that are foreign-owned shifts upwards by 3.5 percentage points. The 
comparable curves for employment and output shift upwards by 13.5 and 17 percentage points 
respectively through the inclusion of indirect foreign ownership. This indicates that indirectly 
foreign-owned plants are even larger than directly foreign-owned plants. The rate of increase in 
the number of indirectly foreign-owned plants during the 1990s was higher than that of directly 
foreign-owned plants, and by 2001 the number of indirectly foreign-owned plants exceeded the 
number of plants with direct foreign ownership interests. Global trends in corporate ownership 
structures may partly explain this shift towards indirect foreign ownership, but it is unlikely 
that indirect foreign ownership in Norwegian manufacturing was non-existent during the 1980s. 
Thus, our sample is likely to underestimate the extent of foreign ownership before 1991.
4See Simpson (1994) for more details about the SIFON register.
5A firm has direct foreign ownership interests if foreigners own part o f the equity of the firm. Firms that are 
owned 50% or more by another Norwegian-based firm (mother), with foreign equity stakes in the mother, are 
classified as indirectly foreign-owned.
6We report how this affects our results in the robustness analysis of Section 3.5.
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Figure 3.1: Foreign presence in Norwegian manufacturing
In percent of total plants, total employment and total output
The figure is based on the sample of large plants.
Compared to neighbouring Sweden and Finland, the extent of foreign ownership in Norway 
seems to be larger in terms of the percentage of total manufacturing employment accounted for 
by foreign firms. In Swedish manufacturing, the share of employment in foreign-owned firms 
increased from 17% in 1990 to 27% in 2000 (Karpathy (2004)), while Finland had an increase 
from 6% to 22% in the same period (Huttunen (2005)). It is not clear whether the definitions of 
foreign ownership in these studies include indirect foreign ownership.
3.2.3 Entry, Exit and Foreign Acquisitions
In the Norwegian Manufacturing Statistics, each plant is assigned an identification number which 
it keeps throughout its life. A plant will even keep its previous identification number when it re­
enters the panel after a time of inactivity as long as production restarts in the same geographic 
location. Mergers or buyouts at the firm-level do not affect the plant identification code. Since 
our data is from a census, we avoid the problem of possible false entries and exits due to plants 
not being sampled. Apart from data errors, false entries and exits may occur in our data set if
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plants move location by closing down in one location just to reopen in another location. In such 
cases, the plant will get a new identification number and will be counted as an entrant.7
Our main concern when defining entry and exit is the treatment of plants that are present in 
the panel for one or more years and then absent for some years before they reappear in the panel 
again. Although the logic of the census would imply that all missing years in the time series 
for a single plant is due to the plant not being in operation that year, we assume that one or two 
consecutive years out of the sample is due to lack of registration rather than a temporary closure. 
When plants disappear for three or more consecutive years before they reappear again, we regard 
them as temporary closed and thus count an extra exit and entry for that plant. We also define as 
temporarily closed those plants that are missing for two consecutive years, but reappear with a 
new owner (a new firm identification number). Thus, we define a plant as entering in year t if  it
appears for the first time in year t , or reappears in year t after a temporary closure. Similarly we
define an exit in year t, if the plant is present in year t and temporarily closed in t + 1, or absent 
all subsequent years.8
We follow Dunne et al. (1988) in their definition of entry and exit rates in year t:
Et : Number of plants present in year t, but not in year t — k.
X t_k : Number of plants present in year t — k, but not in year t.
Pt : Total number of plants present in year t.
A Ft : Number of plants where foreign ownership increased
above 20% from year t — k to year t.
Entry and exit rates are then:
E R t = E t/  Pt-k 
Rt — At_fc/ Pt~k>
and the net entry rate is the difference between the two. The foreign acquisition rate is defined as
AFRt =  AFt/P t_k,
while foreign divestures are those plants with a decrease in foreign ownership from t — k to t.
’Counting the number o f firms that close and open plants of roughly the same size in the same sector in the 
same or the subsequent year indicates that this might be a problem for less than 1.5% of the total number of entries 
and exits in the sample. Most o f these cases seem to be restructuring by multiplant firms that close one or more 
plants and move production to new plants. As one aim of this chapter is to decompose productivity growth into 
contributions from growth within existing plants and growth caused by entry and exit, we prefer to treat the exit and 
entry o f plants by the same firm in the same sector and year (or consecutive year) as entries and exits.
8Only 2.5% of the plants in the sample have what we defined as temporary closures.
Haller, Stefanie A. (2005), Multinational entry and host-country effects 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/94470
3.2 Data Sources and Exposition 71
Figure 3.2: Net foreign and domestic entry rates
Net entry and acquisition rates calculated from year t-5  to t
"■ 1 Domestic entry------- Foreign entry ---------- Foreign aquisition
The net foreign acq. rate is defined as the foreign acq. rate minus the rate of foreign divestures. 
The figure is based on the sample of large plants.
Figure 3.2 shows net foreign and domestic entry rates, and the net foreign acquisition rate 
calculated for overlapping 5-year periods. The foreign net entry rate is very small for the whole 
period, while the domestic net entry rate is negative, with a peak of exits during the recession in 
the early 1990s. The negative net entry rate reflects the overall trend in the economy of moving 
resources out of manufacturing into the services sector. During the period of analysis, the number 
of observations in the large plant sample decreased from 6 990 plants in 1978 to 4 850 plants 
in 2001. During the same period total employment declined by 33% to 220 000 in 2001.9 By 
comparing the development in foreign acquisitions with the foreign and domestic net entry rates 
in Figure 3.2, we can conclude that the increase in foreign presence in Norwegian manufacturing 
over the last 25 years is due mainly to net exit of domestic plants and foreign acquisitions of 
domestic plants.10
9Haskel et al. (2002) report a similar trend for UK manufacturing employment: a decline of 36% between 1980 
to 1992.
I0That foreign entry by acquisition is more frequent than greenfield entry is also found for instance for the UK, 
see Griffith et al. (2004).
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3.3 Total Factor Productivity of Survivors, Entrants and Exi- 
tors
To obtain a usable dataset, we clean the data with respect to missing observations and outliers. 
First, we drop plants with missing information for 80% or more of their life on the variables 
central for TFP calculation. We then define outliers as observations with TFP in the 1st and 
99th percentile of TFP in the same 5-digit sector/year.11 All plants with more than one outlier 
observation are dropped, while we keep plants with one outlier observation, dropping only that 
observation. This procedure gives a sample of 129 700 observations and 8 770 plants. This 
constitutes 86% of the initial large plant sample from 1978-2001. Dropping outliers did not 
change the 2-digit ISIC distribution of the sample much; average plant size is almost the same 
(from 42.9 to 45.4 employees), and the share of foreign plants falls from 7.1% to 6.5%. The 
number of plants per year in our sample is 6 090 in 1978, down to 4 000 in 2001.
To measure total factor productivity (TFP) we use an index calculated at the plant level as
In T F P it =  In Yxt -  a *  In K it -  aj* In Hit -  a "  In Mu , (3.1)
where Yu is deflated plant output and K it, Hit, and Mu are inputs of capital, labour (measured 
in hours) and materials, respectively, and the a t ’s are the average 5-digit industry cost shares.12 
The variable definitions rely in large part on previous work with this data.13
We construct an estimate of capital services using the following aggregation:
Ku = Ru + (0.07 +  6m)V™ +  (0.07 +  6b)\$ ,
where Ru is the cost of rented capital in the plant, V™ and V$ are the estimated values of ma­
chinery and buildings at the beginning of the year, 5m =  0.06 and Sb =  0.02 are the depreciation 
rates that we use. We take the rate of return to capital to be 0.07.14
11 We have experimented with two different cleaning procedures (outliers defined as observations outside two 
standard deviations from the mean, or outside the range o f three times the difference between the 25th and the 75th 
percentile from mean). All outlier measures drop plants evenly distributed across 2-digit sectors and domestic versus 
foreign plants. All procedures drop more observations after 1995. The main results in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 are the 
same for all three cleaning procedures.
12This TFP measure is also used in the productivity decompositions by Foster et al. (1998), Disney et al. (2003 ), 
and M0en (1998).
u E.g. Griliches and Ringstad (1971), Klette (1994), Simpson (1994) and Maen (1998). See the Appendix for 
further details of the variable definitions.
14This is close to the ones used by Griliches and Ringstad (1971). For further details of the capital estimate, see 
the variable descriptions in the Appendix.
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If the reallocation process of the market is "efficient", we should observe that plants that exit 
have lower productivity than continuing plants, while new plants should have higher productivity. 
Overall, the reallocation process seems to be efficient when looking at Figure 3.3, which shows 
smoothed annual average productivity of entrants, exitors and survivors for all manufacturing. 
The average productivity of entrants is above that of survivors most of the period, while the 
productivity of exiting plants is below that of survivors. Around 1997 the average productivity 
of entrants shows a marked decline. This is probably linked to measurement problems for capital, 
as the disappearance of fire insurance values from the Manufacturing Statistics in 1996 affects 
entrants disproportionately.
Figure 3.3: Average TFP of entrants, exitors and survivors
Unweighted average of TFP levels, smoothed by 3 year moving average 
----------- Entrants -----------Exitors ------------- Survivors
To investigate the pattern evident in Figure 3.3 further, we split the entrants, exitors and 
survivors by ownership and calculate average TFP for each group. The averages for the periods
1979-1989 and 1990-2000 relative to the average TFP of domestic survivors are shown in Table 
3.1. From the table we observe that both foreign and domestic entrants have on average higher 
TFP than domestic survivors, while domestic exitors have lower TFP than survivors. Foreign 
exitors are not very different from domestic survivors in terms of productivity during the 1990s. 
Contrary to the common perception that foreign-owned plants are more productive than domestic
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Table 3.1: Average TFP relative to domestic survivors
1979-1989 1990-2000
TFP N TFP N
Dom-entrants *107.16 1554 *104.55 989
For-entrants 104.20 41 108.72 97
Dom-exitors *92.86 2382 *96.43 2090
For-exitors 94.07 75 99.91 203
Dom-survivors 100 59501 100 43857
For-survivors *97.09 1946 *93.46 4356
For-divestures *90.85 176 *88.02 291
For-acquisitions 101.45 244 *93.86 745
For each group o f plants we compute unweighted average TFP each 
year relative to the average TFP o f domestic survivors. We then 
average over years.
plants, in our sample foreign survivors have lower productivity than domestic survivors. To check 
the significance of the results in Table 3.1, we estimated the following regression
In T F P it -  In T F P t =  a  + 0£%t, (3 .2)
where In T F P t is the average TFP of domestic survivors in year t, and In T F P xt is plant-level 
TFP, while Dit is a dummy equal to 1 for each of the 7 other groups of plants: domestic and 
foreign entrants and exitors, foreign acquisitions and divestures, and foreign survivors. We have 
marked with * the results in Table 3.1 that are significantly different from the average TFP of 
domestic survivors at the 90% confidence level. Due to the low numbers of foreign entrants and 
exitors, the average TFP of these groups are measured rather imprecisely. It is worth noting that 
Table 3.1 does not suggest that foreign owners target high-productivity plants for acquisitions 
since the average TFP of plants with an increase in foreign ownership is not significantly above 
that of domestic survivors, while it does seem that foreign owners sell their interests in low- 
productivity plants.
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3.4 Productivity Decompositions and Restructuring
3.4.1 Measurement
Decompositions of productivity have become a common method to analyse the sources of ag­
gregate productivity growth at the industry level. Such decompositions can indicate the relative 
importance of what has been called internal versus external restructuring (Disney et al. (2003), 
Criscuolo et al. (2004)). Internal restructuring is the contribution to productivity growth coming 
from productivity improvements in existing plants, while external restructuring is the contri­
bution coming from market- share effects: more productive plants gaining market share, less 
productive plants losing market share or even exiting the market, and new and more productive 
plants entering the market.
Different methods to decompose productivity growth have been proposed in the literature. 
We use the decomposition proposed by Haltiwanger (1997). This approach tracks changes in 
productivity relative to a reference point (i.e. to industry averages) and is therefore straightfor­
ward to interpret.15 The decomposition starts from an index of industry level productivity
Pt —
where Pt is the index of aggregate industry productivity in year t, 6it quantifies the market share 
of plant i in the industry and pit is the plant’s productivity measure. In our case pu is the TFP 
measure introduced in equation (3.1), with the cost shares a t replaced by the average of year t 
and t — k. Our measure of market share is output. The change in industry productivity between 
period t and t. — k can then be decomposed in the following way:
A Pt ~ (jpi.t-k — Pt-k) +  y^A^jtApit
i t S  ieS ieS
+ (pa -  p t-k) -  fo“ -* -  Pt- k) > (33)
i tE  i t X
where S, N  and X  denote those plants that survive, enter and exit between t and t — k, respec­
tively. We take k to be 5 in the following decompositions. The first term in equation (3.3) shows 
the contribution to productivity growth from TFP changes within surviving plants, the ‘within’
15 A full discussion of how this method compares to alternative decompositions such as those suggested by Baily 
et al. (1992) and Griliches and Regev (1995) is provided in Foster et al. (1998) and in Disney et al. (2004).
Haller, Stefanie A. (2005), Multinational entry and host-country effects 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/94470
76 Foreign Firms and Host-Country Productivity: Does the Mode of Foreign Entry Matter?
effect. The second term is the ‘between’ effect, which is positive if those plants that initially had 
above average TFP are the ones that gain market share. The third term is a ‘covariance’ term 
that will be positive when market share increases (falls) for plants with positive (negative) pro­
ductivity growth. The last two terms represent the contribution to productivity growth accounted 
for by entry and exit. The sum of the entry and exit effect is referred to as net entry, or turnover 
effect. These terms are positive when there is entry (exit) of plants with above- (below-)average 
productivity.
Many studies have used equation (3.3) for decompositions of aggregate TFP growth to study 
the relative role of internal versus external restructuring. Our analysis is most closely related to 
two previous studies that explicitly investigate the role of foreign firms in such decompositions: 
Okamoto and Sj0holm (1999) and De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003). Thus, we make a distinc­
tion between domestic and foreign-owned plants, but in contrast to the above mentioned studies 
we split the surviving plants into 4 groups; plants that are domestic all years between t — k and t , 
plants that are foreign all years between t — k and t, plants that change ownership and end up as 
foreign in year t (foreign acquisitions), and plants that change ownership and end up as domestic 
in year t (foreign divestures).16
3.4.2 Decomposition results
Figure 3.4 shows aggregate TFP growth calculated for overlapping 5-year periods from 1978 
until 2001. Aggregate manufacturing productivity growth was obtained by weighting the TFP 
growth of each 3-digit industry with that industry’s share of total manufacturing output.17 The 
Norwegian business cycle is strongly evident in the figure; with two major booms (peaking in 
1987 and 1998) and a recession in between.18 On a separate scale, Figure 3.4 also shows the 
contribution from the turnover of domestic and foreign plants. It is evident that the contribution 
from net entry closely follows the business cycle.
For further results from the productivity decomposition, we have selected two periods at 
similar points in these two booms, that is, the 5-year periods 1982-1987 and 1993-1998 ending 
at the peaks. This also makes it easier to compare the role of foreign-owned plants in the 1990s to 
that in the 1980s. Table 3.2 shows some of the components of the decomposition. From the table
16Okamoto and Sjaholm (1999) drop plants that change ownership during the period for which they calculate 
TFP growth.
,7The output share of each industry is the average o f output share in t  and t  — k.
18 The cycle in the TFP growth curve corresponds closely to the 5 -year growth rates of GDP and aggregate 
consumption in Norway.
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Figure 3.4: Aggregate TFP growth and contribution from net entry
TFP growth and net entry contribution calculated from year t-5  to t 
——  TFP --------- Net foreign entry-------------- Net domestic entry
Table 3.2: Components of the TFP decomposition
Plants Market share TFP TFP growth
82-87 93-98 82-87 93-98 82-87 93-98 82-87 93-98
Dom-survivors 4781 3370 0.74 0.46 0.00 -0.00 0.04 0.02
For-survivors 114 273 0.06 0.27 -0.00 -0.04 0.11 0.05
For-divestures 70 135 0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.14 0.01
For-acquis. 75 268 0.02 0.13 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.06
Dom-entrants 772 322 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.05
For-entrants 25 58 0.01 0.02 0.23 0.09
Dom-exitors 1004 776 0.10 0.07 -0.05 -0.02
For-exitors 29 76 0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.04
Market shares are aggregated from 3-digit level using 3-digit output shares. Entrants’ market share 
is calculated in year t, survivors’ and exitors’ in t-5.
TFP columns show average deviations from aggregate 3-digit TFP. For entrants it is the deviation 
of plant-level TFP in year t with aggregate TFP in t-5, for exitors and survivors we compute the 
deviation in t-5.
The TFP growth columns show unweighted average TFP growth from t-5 to t.
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we see that the market shares of both, entrants and exitors have not changed much from the first 
to the second boom. Entrants and exitors have market shares of less than 10% in both periods. 
The big change from the boom during the 1980s to the boom during the 1990s is the increase in 
market share of foreign plants. Taking foreign survivors and foreign acquisitions together, their 
market share increased from 8% in 1982 to 40% in 1993. The TFP of entrants is above average 
TFP and that of exitors is below average. Those plants experiencing foreign acquisitions have 
initially TFP below average. Even though foreign survivors have below average TFP, their TFP 
growth is larger than in the surviving domestic plants.
Table 3.3: Decomposition of TFP growth for 1982-1987 and 1993-1998
Period
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
1982-1987 1993-1998
Survivors-within 4.24 0.36 -0.32 0.85
Acquisitions-within 1.85 0.09 0.18 1.24
Survivors-between -0.46 -0.16 -0.28 -0.11
Acquisitions-be tween -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.26
Survivors-cov 3.25 0.29 1.64 0.68
Acquisitions-cov 0.28 0.04 0.14 0.42
Entrants 0.85 0.08 0.60 0.10
Exitors 0.14 0.00 -0.16 -0.01
Total TFP growth 10.83 5.25
What is labelled domestic acquisitions here, is usually referred to as foreign 
divestures.
Table 3.3 shows the results of the decomposition of aggregate TFP growth according to equa­
tion (3.3). As in most TFP decompositions, the within effect is the dominant driver of aggregate 
TFP growth. The total within effect accounted for 60% of aggregate TFP growth in the 1982- 
1987 period, while its contribution is reduced to 40% in the 1993-1998 period. Foreign plants 
played a negligible role in the within effect during the first period, but in the second period all 
of the positive within effect is accounted for by foreign survivors and foreign acquisitions. The 
between effect for surviving plants is negative in both periods for domestic and foreign plants, in­
dicating that surviving plants with above-average productivity in the base year lose market shares 
over the 5-year periods under consideration. The covariance effect is positive; which indicates 
that plants with positive productivity growth increase their market share. The contribution from
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net entry equals the sum of the entry and exit effect.19 Net entry accounts for about 10% of TFP 
growth in both periods.
3.5 Mode of Foreign Entry and Domestic Productivity
3.5.1 Methods and Variables
From the above analysis it is apparent that at least since the 1990s, foreign firms have become 
major players in the Norwegian economy. Every year a small number of highly productive 
greenfield entrants penetrates the Norwegian market. Foreign owners entering the market by 
acquiring an established domestic plant manage to produce an impressive contribution to over­
all TFP growth in these plants. Recent research on a number of countries by Bartelsman et al. 
(2004) indicates that an ongoing entry and exit process promotes also the productivity growth 
of incumbent firms. In this section, we therefore examine whether entry of foreign firms has a 
direct impact on established firms in the market that cannot be read from the productivity decom­
positions. We focus, in particular, on how the mode of foreign entry affects the productivity of 
domestic firms, defined as those plants that have Norwegian owners throughout their presence in 
our panel.
To do so, we estimate production functions of the following form
In Yu =  o In IN P U T S « + £ PkFO Ru . k + j Z tt + Vi + vt + e*. (3.4)
fc=0
Equation (3.4) states that output Y  depends on the inputs K  (capital), M  (material) and H  
(hours), a plant specific effect vu a time specific effect vt and an error term £tt. In contrast 
to In T F P  used above, we do not constrain the output elasticities of the inputs to be the fac­
tor shares, but estimate them.20 In equation (3.4), FOR]<t-k is our measure of foreign entry, it 
usually contains the employment-weighted entry rate of new foreign plants E N T R Y jt and the 
employment-weighted rate of foreign acquisitions AC Q U ISn  and their lags k. It seems impor­
tant to include lags of the foreign entry and foreign presence variables as there is evidence from 
the literature on productivity spillovers that the effects from foreign presence may take time to 
materialise (e.g. Mansfield and Romeo (1980) and Sembenelli and Siotis (2005)). Where ap­
19In Table 3.3 an exit effect larger than zero indicates that exit increases aggregate productivity growth; i.e. it is 
plants with below-average productivity that exit the industry.
“ The results using our constructed TFP measure point in the same direction and are reported in the robustness 
analysis at the end of this section.
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propriate we also include a set of competition variables (Z ).21 That is we want to capture the 
effect foreign entry has on domestic productivity over and above potential competition effects. 
Looking at industry-specific variables we will only capture horizontal effects from foreign entry 
and acquisitions.22
The spillover literature on the impact of foreign presence on local productivity has produced 
rather mixed results (Górg and Greenaway (2004)). Gorg and Strobl (2001) emphasize that the 
results in these studies are sensitive to the way foreign presence is measured. In fact, any measure 
of foreign presence will capture some combination of competition effects and potential spillovers 
from foreign to domestic firms.23 In traditional measures such as the share of employment or 
the share of output in foreign-owned firms, newly entering foreign firms will be mixed with 
established foreign firms and even with foreign-owned plants exiting the market. To make our 
analysis comparable to the spillover studies we report results using a traditional foreign presence 
variable (F O R P R E S n ) for which measures foreign presence as the share of industry
employment in foreign-owned plants.
The strongest impact from foreign-owned firms is yet to be expected when they bring in 
new capital and even more when a new foreign-owned subsidiary is established (greenfield in­
vestment). In particular, greenfield entry and foreign acquisitions are likely to have a different 
impact on the market structure in the industry.24 While greenfield entry increases production 
capacity and therefore also competition, acquisitions do not necessarily have an immediate im­
pact on market structure. Moreover, competition or efficiency-enhancing effects may take longer 
to materialise if an acquisition involves substantial restructuring in the acquired plant. Changes 
in market structure through foreign entry may affect the effort and therefore the productivity of 
local firms. Apart from these competition effects, the presence of foreign firms may have an im­
pact on the productivity of domestic firms if they generate technology or knowledge spillovers. 
As these effects work in opposite directions, it is not immediately obvious what sign we should 
expect on the entry and acquisition rates.
21 In similar approaches production functions have been ‘augmented’ with variables capturing, for example, prod­
uct market competition (Nickell (1996); Disney et al. (2004)), trade liberalisation measures (Pavcnik (1999)), or 
measures o f foreign presence (some recent contributions are e.g. Haskel et al. (2002), Keller and Yeaple (2003), 
Damijan et al. (2003)).
22 A recent strand of literature looking at backward and forward linkages between industries has been initiated by 
Smarzynska Javorcik (2004).
23Sembenelli and Siotis (2005) attempt to disentangle the two effects.
24See e.g. UNCTAD (2000, p. 145) for an informal description and Chapter 2 for a more formal exposition.
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To get an idea of the size of the competition effect in the overall impact of foreign entry on 
domestic productivity, we use a set of variables that was first suggested in Nickell (1996). These 
variables are industry concentration (CO NCjt), market share (M Slt), profit margins (PM lt) and 
industry import penetration (7M P / t ).25 Technological differences across industries imply very 
different requirements in terms of size and scale for firms to be able to operate in their respective 
environments (Sutton (1996)), thus high market shares need not indicate a lack of competition. 
However, changes in market structure over time are still going to be a reasonably good measure 
of changes in competition. The profit margins measure (P M it) is thought to capture possible 
rents that may be available to shareholders and workers in the form of higher pay and lower 
effort. As higher efficiency would raise both profit margins and market shares, these variables 
are potentially endogenous, which could result in a positive coefficient. We address this problem 
by lagging both measures by two years and note that endogeneity would bias the coefficients 
towards zero. All of these measures are constructed at the 5-digit ISIC level. As we do not 
have plant-level trade data, we compute import penetration IM P u  at the 3-digit ISIC level. If 
foreign entry and acquisitions are more concentrated in industries that are doing well or have 
good growth prospects, the domestic plants might be able to maintain their market shares even 
after foreign entry. What is more, leaving out variables that could be proxies for this may give 
rise to a spurious correlation between the entry variables and productivity. We try to control for 
this by using 5-digit industry output growth IN D G R jt as a proxy for how well an industry is 
doing.
To eliminate plant and industry fixed effects we estimate equation (3.4) in first differences. 
If there are important unobservable variables that differ both across firms and over time (e.g. 
managerial ability), the error term will not be white noise. Olley and Pakes (1996) propose a 
structural approach that addresses this issue by assuming that such shocks can be reflected in 
investment behaviour as it is not correlated with current output. However, this approach relies 
on the assumption of perfectly competitive markets, which seems inappropriate when looking at 
competition effects.26 A further issue is that our sample of firms will consist only of firms that are 
active in the market but not of those firms that exit, i.e. our estimations are likely to be biased by 
selection. To address this issue we also estimate the model using the Heckman selection model 
using two different specifications for the selection equation.
25 For the construction o f these, see the variable definitions in the Appendix.
26For a discussion see Griliches and Mairesse (1998).
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Taking first differences of (3.4), our estimation equation is:
A In Yu = ai A In h a  + o 2A In Mit + Q3A In Hit (3.5)
+ ¿ 2 tfA F O R U - k 
*=0
-f- 'yiAAlSi_t—2 H" 72A P M u -2  73ACO N Cjt
+  74A /M P y ,t_2 +  75A  I N D G R j t  +  v t +  £it.
This equation includes our variables for inputs, the different measures of foreign entry and for­
eign presence, and if appropriate also the competition variables. We estimate equation (3.5) on 
the sample of firms that are Norwegian-owned throughout their presence in our panel. Summary 
statistics of the variables used in the regressions are presented in Table 3.7 in the Appendix. 
As a first step we compare a more widely used measure of foreign presence to our measures 
of foreign entry. We then present our main results for the two different modes of foreign entry, 
controlling also for selection. A number of robustness checks using different specifications and 
control variables are reported at the end of this section.
3.5.2 Results
Table 3.4 compares the results using the foreign presence variable and the two measures of 
foreign entry with and without controlling for competition and industry growth. We first estimate 
equation (3.5) without the foreign entry variables (column 1). All inputs are highly significant, 
the variables capturing product market competition are negatively signed with the exception 
of import penetration and industry growth. That is to say that decreases in market shares and 
profit margins are conducive to the productivity of established plants, although the coefficient 
on market share is not significant. Higher concentration implies lower productivity. Foreign 
competition, in the form of import penetration, seems to enhance the productivity of local firms, 
but not significantly so. In addition, industry output growth is positively correlated with plant 
productivity.
In column 2, the results for overall foreign presence measured by the share of employment 
in foreign-owned firms F O R P R E S jt are reported. While all of the individual lags are nega­
tively signed, not all of them are significant.27 However, the overall effect of foreign presence 
Yi A F O R j is negative and significant as indicated by the p-value in square brackets. Controlling
^Higher lags than k — •) for F O R P R E S n  and E N T R Y n , and k — 3 for A C Q U IS jt were not significant.
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Table 3.4: Foreign presence, foreign entry, competition and domestic productivity
3.5 Mode of Foreign Entry and Domestic Productivity
Dependent variable A In Yit
F O R  =  - F O R P R E S  E N T R Y  A CQ U IS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A In Ku -072** .072** .072**
(.002) (.002) (.002)
A In Mit .516** .517** .517**
(.002) (.002) (.002)
A In Hit .283** .282** .283 **
**
(.003) (.003) (.003)
AM Si.t-2  -.050  -.051
(.057) (.057)
A PM i t _2 -.061** -.060
(.008) (.008)
A C O N C n  -.035* -.034
(.016) (.016)
A lM P j t—2 .024 .022
(.021) (.021)
A IN D G R n  .021** .022
(.003) (.003)
A FORj  -.006 .005
(.011) (-011)
A F O R j t - i  -.044** -.042**
(.011) (.011)
A F O R j  t_2 - .0 0 1  - .0 0 1
(.011) (.011)
A F O R j  t_3 -.028* -.029**
(.012) (.037)
A F O R h - a  -.037** -.035**
(.012) (.012)
V A  FO Rj -.116 - .1 1 2
|p| l-oooi [.000]
R 2 .76 .76 .76
N  66,144 66,144 66,144
Plants 6,254 6,254 6,254
.072** .072** .072** .072**
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
.517** .516** .517** .517**
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.005)
.283** .283** .282** .283**
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
-.048 -.049
(.057) (.057)
-.061** -.060**
(.008) (.008)
-.035* -.034*
(.016) (.016)
.025 .024
(.021) (.021)
.021** .023**
(.003) (.003)
.036** .035**
(.012) (.012)
-.123** -.109** .025 .026
(.027) (.027) (.016) (.016)
-.065 -.054 .053** .054**
(.035) (.035) (.017) (.017)
-.095** -.083* .041** .0.39**
(.038) (.037) (.014) (.014)
-.097** -.082*
(.034) (.030)
-.381 -.328 .155 .154
1-000] (.002] |.001] |.001]
.76 .76 .76 .76
66,144 66,144 66,144 66,144
6,254 6,254 6,254 6,254
**,* indicate significance at 1% and 5% respectively.
Robust standard errors in round parentheses.
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for product market competition as done in column 3, the effect of foreign presence decreases by 
very little and the coefficients on the inputs and competition variables are almost unaffected.
In columns 4-7 we look at the foreign entry variables. Columns 4 and 5 show the results 
for the greenfield entry rate of foreign firms E N T R Y j t. The coefficients on the lags of foreign 
entiy are all negative and mostly significant. The overall effect on foreign entry is negative 
and significant and larger than that of F O R P R E S j t . When we control for competition and 
industry growth rates, the effect of the ENTRYjt  variables decreases, as can be seen by the 
smaller long-run effect in column 5. Note that it is the inclusion of the industry growth rate that 
is responsible for most of the decrease in the long-run coefficient, excluding I N D G R n  from 
column 5 results in a long-run effect on foreign entry of — .377[.000]. Looking at the impact of 
the foreign acquisition rate on domestic productivity (columns 6 and 7), all the coefficients on 
ACQUISjt  and its lags have positive signs. Their joint effect is significantly positive, and is 
virtually unaffected by including the competition and industry growth variables in column 7.
In Table 3.5 foreign entry and foreign acquisitions are included together. As the input co­
efficients hardly vary across specifications they are not reported here for brevity. The results in 
the first two columns of Table 3.5 confirm those of columns 4-7 of Table 3.4. An increase in 
foreign entry has a negative and significant impact on the productivity of the domestic plants, 
while the effect from foreign acquisitions is positive. In absolute terms the negative effect from 
foreign entry outweighs the positive effect from foreign acquisitions even though there are much 
fewer foreign greenfield entrants than foreign acquisitions. When controlling for competition 
(column 2 ) the long-run effect of foreign entry becomes smaller, while the long-run effect of 
foreign acquisitions is unaffected. As in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.4, most of the difference 
in the long-run coefficients between the specifications in columns 1 and 2 is due to greenfield 
entrants targeting expanding industries. Excluding I N D G R j t from the specification in column 
2, the long-run coefficients on ACQUISj  and ENTRY]  are — .389[.000] and .154[.001], 
respectively.
The last two columns of Table 3.5 estimate equation (3.5) using a Heckman selection model. 
By virtue of observability, our sample consists of only those firms that survive, hence if foreign 
entry or foreign acquisitions affect the probability of survival, our earlier estimates may be bi­
ased. Therefore column S (H AZ)  conditions survival on a probit of so-called hazard variables 
that have been found to determine exit (see e.g. Bernard and Jensen (2002)): plant age, age 
squared, plant size - measured as the number of employees, productivity - measured by our TFP 
measure from above and a multiplant dummy that takes value one if the plant is part of a mul­
tiplant firm. We also include the first differences of our foreign entry and acquisition variables.
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Table 3.5: Modes of foreign entry, competition and domestic productivity
3.5 Mode of Foreign Entry and Domestic Productivity
Dependent variable A In Yu
(1) (2 ) S(H AZ) S(OP)
A M -.047 -.028 -.029
(.057) (.057) (.057)
A PM m_2 -.060** -.059** -.058**
(.008) (.008) (.008)
A C O N C n -.034* -.025 -.025
(.016) (.018) (.018)
A / M P ;,t_2 .024 .032 .032
(.021) (.019) (.019)
A I N D G R It .021** .021** .021**
(.003) (.004) (.004)
A E N T R Y IX_ X -.134’* -.119** -.126** -.126**
(.027) (.028) (.034) (.034)
A E N T R Y U _2 -.074* -.063 -.082 -.082
(.035) (.035) (.049) (.049)
A E N T R Y Iit. z -.090* -.078* -.106** -.105**
(.038) (.035) (.041) (.041)
A E N T R Y Jt_4 -.095* -.078* -.095* -.094*
(.034) (.034) (.043) (.043)
A A C Q U lSIt .033** .033** .028* .028**
(.012) (.012) (.014) (.014)
A  A C Q U I S ^ .024 .025 .013 .013
(.016) (.016) (.015) (.015)
AAC Q U ISu . 2 .059** .058** .051** .051**
(.017) (.017) (.019) (.019)
A  ACQUISj ,t-3 .042** .040** .035* .035*
(.014) (-014) (.015) (.015)
£  A EN T RY i -.394 -.339 -.409 -.408
bl 1-000] [.002] [.003] [.003]
^ A A C Q U I S j .159 .157 .127 .128
Ip)
[.001] [.0011 [.007] [.006]
R 2 .76 .76 - -
x 2 ( i ) _ 13.04 20.38A. \ /
p(SE) —,048(.013) —.046(.010)
N 66,144 66,144 67,370 67,475
Plants 6,254 6,254 7,349 7,373
**,* indicate significance at 1% and 5% respectively.
Robust standard errors in round parentheses.
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In turn, in the last column S (O P ) we condition survival on investment and capital to capture the 
Olley and Pakes (1996) idea that investment which is observable but not correlated with current 
output can pick up unobservable shocks to productivity. In this equation, selection is determined 
by plant’s investment shares and their capital in logs from levels up to their 4th powers.28 Both 
selection equations yield similar results. The variables in the selection probits are jointly sig­
nificant, as indicated by the \ 2 values. The selection terms p are also significant. The standard 
errors on almost all coefficients including inputs increase slightly. The overall negative impact of 
foreign entry is larger compared to column 2 , whereas the overall impact of foreign acquisitions 
is somewhat smaller29
To summarise, the overall effect of foreign presence on the productivity of the domestic 
plants is negative and robust to controlling for competition and industry growth. Considering 
only the foreign entry variables, much of this negative effect of foreign presence appears to 
be generated by newly established foreign plants. The addition of these new efficient foreign- 
owned plants to the market increases product market competition, which is confirmed when 
measuring foreign entry based on a plant count. In this case the negative effect from foreign 
entry is even stronger, while using the domestic entry rate does not yield a significant effect.30 
The negative impact on domestic productivity is usually attributed to a market stealing effect 
by the new foreign firms which forces the established firms up their average cost curve and, 
hence, decreases their productivity (Aitken and Harrison (1999)). As foreign plants enter mainly 
in expanding industries, the negative impact from foreign entry is smaller when controlling for 
industry growth.31 After controlling for competition and industry growth we are still left with 
a significant negative impact of foreign entry on domestic productivity. A possible explanation 
for this might be that the new foreign entrants attract highly qualified workers from existing 
plants. If the affected plants have difficulties in replacing these workers adequately, this will 
have a detrimental impact on their productivity. Foreign acquisitions do not only target expanding 
industries and they are not associated with increased product market competition. In fact, they 
have a positive impact on domestic productivity. It is plausible that foreign acquisitions leave 
the existing firms in the market time to adapt to whatever externalities the change in ownership
28As zeros in investment are meaningful observations (see Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003) for Norway) we prefer 
to scale investment by dividing through annual averages instead of taking logs.
29 We also estimated all the specifications reported in Table 3.4 correcting for the two selection terms reported 
here with very similar results.
30These results are not reported here, but are available from the authors on request.
31 The correlation coefficient between E N T R Y n  and I N  D C  fir t at the aggregate level is positive (.0825) and 
significant at 1%. At the industry level, the foreign entry rate and industry growth are mostly positively correlated 
as well. However, at more disaggregated industry levels, the number of industries where the correlation is negative 
is higher.
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might bring about, possibly because they are themselves handicapped by substantial in-house 
restructuring after a takeover. Moreover, possible channels for spillovers are more likely to 
exist for these plants. As they have been present in the market before becoming foreign-owned, 
they may have well-established ties with other firms in the market through which technology or 
knowledge diffusion can occur.
3.5.3 Robustness Analysis
To check the robustness of our results we re-estimated the specification in column 2 and the 
selection equations excluding one 2-digit ISIC industry at the time. In each of these regressions 
the results go very much in the same direction as in the whole manufacturing sector. Taking out 
larger sectors that see the bulk of foreign entry or acquisitions obviously decreases the long-run 
effects and their significance.
In Table 3.6, we report the results for a number of robustness checks. They are all variations 
of equation (3.5). In column 1, we report the results from our constructed TFP measure used for 
the productivity decompositions in Section 3.4. The coefficients on foreign entry and acquisitions 
are 3-5 times larger than in the original specification and significant. Part of the reason for this 
might be that this TFP measure is based on average cost shares that include all plants and not 
only the domestic plants in our estimation panel. In sectors with many capital-intensive foreign 
firms the measured TFP of the domestic firms may then be biased downward.
Table 3.6: Robustness 
Dependent variable A In Yit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP from direct full ind. specific GMM
decompos. ownership sample input coeff.s
£  A E N T R Y , 
M
-1.682
[.000]
-.559
[.313]
-.286
|.003|
-.270
[.013]
-.362
1-016]
£  AACQU1S! 
\p\
.666
|.000]
.154
1-0011
.156
1-001]
.143
[.002]
.055
(.606]
R 2 .03 .77 .75 .78 -
N 66,144 66,144 79,252 66,144 66,136
Plants 6,254 6,254 7,297 6,254 6 , 254
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As noted in Section 3.2, from 1990 onwards our definition of foreign ownership includes 
both directly and indirectly foreign-owned plants. In column 2 of Table 3.6, we re-estimate the 
specification from above with our foreign entry and acquisition variables based on direct foreign 
ownership only. Foreign acquisitions are significant with almost the same coefficient size as 
in column 2 of Table 3.5. This indicates that the positive effect of acquisitions in Table 3.5 
comes mainly from acquisitions of plants that are directly foreign-owned. As in most of our 
specifications, the long-run coefficient on entry is negative also when we only consider entry 
of directly foreign-owned plants. However, the long-run effect is insignificant because one of 
the four individual coefficients on A E N T R Y ^ -k  is positive and significant at the 10% level. 
Instead, the remaining three negative lags (two of which are significant) suggest a much stronger 
negative impact from direct foreign entry than indicated by the long-run coefficient in column
2. By comparing the results on the foreign entry variables in Table 3.5 and column 2 of Table 
3.6, we can infer that the coefficients on the entry of indirectly foreign-owned plants are negative 
as well. Thus, combining direct and indirect foreign ownership helps us to get the number of 
observations sufficient to get significant results.
In column 3 we estimate equation (3.5) on the full sample used in the decomposition results. 
That is, this sample also includes foreign-owned plants and plants that change ownership in the 
period under consideration. The long-run coefficient on E N T R Y h is lower in absolute value 
than in column 2 of Table 3.5. Hence, the negative effect of foreign entry is more pronounced 
for domestic firms than for other foreign firms present in the market. A similar result has been 
obtained by Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for the Czech Republic. They find that the produc­
tivity of foreign affiliates and domestic plants that are part of joint ventures benefit from foreign 
ownership while the effect is negative for plants without foreign engagement.
Column 4 reports results for a more general specification of equation (3.5) in which we al­
low the a  coefficients on inputs to vary across 2-digit industries by interacting the inputs with 
industry dummies. Our base specification constrains the input elasticities to be the same for all 
manufacturing industries. This might ignore important differences between industries and thus 
bias our estimates of the effect of foreign entry. The overall effects of foreign entry and acquisi­
tions are somewhat smaller, but the individual as well as the long-run effects remain significant. 
Similar results are obtained when varying the input coefficients across 3-digit industries or the 
industry classification used by Statistics Norway which is somewhere between the 2- and 3-digit 
ISIC level and corresponds to the level at which our deflators are defined (not reported).
The absence of feasible instruments for endogenous variables in particular inputs when es­
timating production functions may seriously bias the input coefficients. Since the inputs in our
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model are likely to be correlated with the idiosyncratic component of the error term eit, our above 
results might be affected by this. While we are not interested in the input coefficients per se, we 
nonetheless re-estimate our results using the Generalised Method of Moments estimator sug­
gested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The idea is that as long as the idiosyncratic component is 
white noise, twice or more lagged variables in levels are legitimate instruments for the first differ­
enced right-hand side variables. Treating inputs and both foreign entry variables as endogenous 
we obtain a coefficient on greenfield entry that is of similar size to the one in column 2 in Table 
3.5, while the coefficient on foreign acquisitions is smaller in size and insignificant. The p-value 
for the test of no MA(1) error in the residuals is zero, rejecting the null of no autocorrelation, 
which is to be expected since first differencing should induce MA(1) residual autocorrelation. 
However, the p-value for the test of no MA(2) error in the residuals is only 0.010, which is too 
small to confidently reject the null of no autocorrelation. It is nonetheless comforting that the 
results of this dynamic specification do at least point in the same direction.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we examine the contributions of foreign-owned plants to productivity growth in a 
panel of Norwegian manufacturing plants, as well as their impact on the productivity of domestic 
establishments. While the largest part of productivity growth is generated within surviving plants 
- both domestic and foreign, the contribution of external restructuring via entry and exit of plants 
is not negligible. Our results show that foreign greenfield entrants have higher productivity 
compared to an average domestic firm and also compared to their domestic counterparts. The 
productivity decomposition further reveals that during the 1990s at least, foreign acquired plants 
are important contributors to productivity growth.
To examine the impact of the mode of foreign entry on changes in the productivity of native 
plants we estimate production functions. Overall foreign presence exerts a negative impact on the 
productivity of domestic plants. When considering, in particular, the effect from foreign entry, 
it appears that the effect of greenfield entry is very different from the effect of foreign entry via 
acquisition. Greenfield entry has a negative impact on the productivity of domestic plants. This 
effect is reduced when controlling for industry output growth as foreign owners set up new plants 
mainly in expanding industries. A smaller part of this negative impact can be attributed to the 
increase in competition associated with the entry of highly efficient foreign plants. Hence, there 
is a market-stealing effect from foreign greenfield entrants which forces the domestic plants 
up their average cost curves and decreases their productivity as a result. After controlling for
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industry growth and competition effects, the negative impact from foreign entry on domestic 
plants is smaller, but still significant. It could be due to foreign firms attracting highly qualified 
or highly motivated workers from domestic plants resulting in productivity losses in these plants. 
The effect of foreign acquisitions is unaffected when controlling for competition and industry 
output growth. While their impact is smaller in size than that of greenfield entry, they generate 
a positive effect on the productivity of domestic plants. As these plants were already present in 
the market before being acquired by a foreign owner, they are likely to have established linkages 
with other plants in the host economy which may serve as a basis for knowledge, technology or 
human capital spillovers.
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3.A Appendix
Data and Variable Definitions
AC Q U ISjt Employment in plants that were acquired by a foreign owner between years t and 
t — k as a share of 5-digit industry employment in year t — k.
CO NCjt Joint market share of the 5 largest firms in terms of output. 5-digit industry level.
E N T R Y jt Employment in foreign-owned plants present in year t but not in year t — k as a share 
of 5-digit industry employment in year t — k.
Hu Number of person hours in the plant. Since only blue-collar hours are reported prior to 1983, 
and only total hours from 1983, we estimate total hours before 1983 by using information 
on the blue-collar share of the total wage bill. Rented labour hours are calculated from the 
costs of rented labour using the calculated average wage for own employees.
IM  Pjt Rate of imports over domestic consumption (IM P It =  M jtf{Y it +  M [t — X Jt)). Import 
and export data are taken from the OECD ITCS International Trade Data SITC Rev. 2 and 
have been converted to 3-digit ISIC Rev. 2 codes using a conversion table provided by 
Maskus (1989). The data are converted into NOK using the annual average exchange rate 
provided in the International Financial Statistics. The output measure is constructed from 
the full census of manufacturing.
IN D G R jt Industry output growth between years t and t — k at the 5-digit level.
K it Our estimate of capital services use the following aggregation:
Ku =  Rit + (0.07 + 8m)V™ + (0.07 +  <Sfc)V&
where Rit is the cost of rented capital in the plant, \ 7t" and V£ are the estimated values 
of machinery and buildings at the beginning of the year, Sm =  0.06 and Sb = 0.02 are 
the depreciation rates that we use. The estimated values of buildings and machinery are 
obtained from information on fire insurance values. To reduce noise and avoid discarding 
too many observations with missing fire insurance values, we smooth these values using 
the perpetual inventory method. Fire insurance values are not recorded after 1995, thus 
from 1996 we estimate capital values by adding investments and taking account of depre­
ciation. We also used where possible, estimates of firm-level capital values (assigned to
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the plant level according to employment shares) as start values for plants with entry after 
1995. These capital values were obtained from recent work to improve on capital estimates 
in Norwegian manufacturing (see Raknerud et a). (2003)). We use separate price defla­
tors for inputs and output and for investment in buildings and machinery, obtained from 
Statistics Norway. The aggregation level for the price deflators is according to the sector 
classification used in the National Accounts, and is somewhere between the 2- and 3-digit 
ISIC level.
A/it Total cost of materials used. Since this variable in the data includes rented labour and capi­
tal, we subtract these and allocate them to the labour and capital measures, respectively.
multiplant Dummy equal to 1 if the plant is part of a multi-plant firm.
MSu Plant output as a share of 5-digit industry output.
PMu Net output less material and wage costs divided by 5-digit industry output. We dropped 
observations with profit margins smaller than —1.
Yu Gross production value, net of sales taxes and subsidies.
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____________Table 3.7: Summary statistics______________
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Levels
lnKit
In K it
In Mu
In Hu
MSu
PMu
CO NCH
IM P jt
ENTRY'jt
ACQ U ISn
F O R P R E S h
Differences
A In V it
A In K it
A in Mu
A In Hu
A MSu
AP M u
A C O N C n
A IM  Pn
A E N T R Y h
A A C Q U IS n
A F O R P R E S n
Selection Variables
ageit
sizeu
TFPu
multiplantu
investm entu
9.524 1.261
7.102 1.278
8.704 1.46
3.308 1.097
0.016 0.045
0.081 0.126
0.365 0.218
0.358 0.269
0.002 0.021
0.017 0.053
0.112 0.154
-0.004 0.339
0.057 0.321
0.014 0.449
-0.029 0.378
0 0.012
-0.006 0.127
0.003 0.045
0.004 0.035
0 0.029
0 0.073
0.009 0.068
16.592 5.84
28.862 57.229
3.939 1.323
0.12 0.324
0 0
4.085 14.462 66144
0.593 12.301 66144
1.384 14.165 66144
0 8.154 66144
0 1 66144
-1 0.982 66144
0.091 1 66144
-0.325 1.322 66144
0 1.229 66144
0 0.950 66144
0 0.978 66144
-5.464 5.952 66144
-5.2 4.297 66144
-7.014 7.142 66144
-5.043 5.44 66144
-0.719 0.688 66144
-1.246 1.349 66144
-0.765 0.887 66144
-1.138 0.795 66144
-1.229 1.229 66144
-0.950 0.950 66144
-0.985 0.958 66144
5 28 66144
1 2284 66144
-2.258 9.994 66144
0 1 66144
-0.009 0.018 66144
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